AgentIndex x402

Token Risk

token_risk

Read-onlyIdempotent

Base token risk scan: on-chain rug check and honeypot-style flag detection for any ERC-20, no GoPlus, DexScreener or other vendor - real Base token safety. Reads bytecode for mint/blacklist/pause/tax powers, EIP-1967 proxy, renounced ownership, plus Uniswap v2/v3 and Aerodrome liquidity. A Jev avoid/caution/acceptable verdict leads the response, raw signals follow. Holder concentration included only when history fits 1-2 log queries. Try GET /token-risk/sample.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`address`	Yes	ERC-20 contract address on Base to analyze (0x + 40 hex chars).

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`address`	Yes
`network`	No
`verdict`	Yes	avoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'model' (a real model decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever the model does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA.
`timing_ms`	No	signals (bytecode+liquidity via Multicall3, and holders - run together, sharing a 2s window), verdict, total, in milliseconds. Total is never intended to exceed 4.0s: signal-gathering and the Jev-or-rules verdict are each bounded so their sum can't exceed that budget by construction, not because anything gets cancelled at the last moment - added 2026-09-28 after a real payment settled for an analysis whose client had already timed out.
`x402_receipt`	No	Billing and provenance receipt for this call.
`holders_analysis`	Yes	status: 'ok' (with distinct_holders/top10_pct_of_supply), 'skipped_established_token' (history too large to reconstruct in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls), or 'unavailable' (the 3-second per-stage budget was exceeded).
`bytecode_analysis`	Yes	mint/blacklist/pause/tax flags, proxy and ownership status.
`liquidity_analysis`	Yes	Uniswap v2/v3 and Aerodrome pools found, with reserves.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedOct 20, 2026

changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / description

Previous value: -"avoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'jev' (a real Jev decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever Jev does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA."New value: +"avoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'model' (a real model decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever the model does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA."

changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / verdict_source / enum

Previous value: -[
-  "jev",
-  "rules"
-]New value: +[
+  "model",
+  "rules"
+]

Changed8 schema fields changedSep 28, 2026

changedOutput schema / properties / holders_analysis / description

Previous value: -"Top-10 holder concentration, or {\"status\": \"skipped_established_token\"} if the full transfer history does not provably fit in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls."New value: +"status: 'ok' (with distinct_holders/top10_pct_of_supply), 'skipped_established_token' (history too large to reconstruct in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls), or 'unavailable' (the 3-second per-stage budget was exceeded)."

addedOutput schema / properties / timing_ms

Added value: +{
+  "description": "signals (bytecode+liquidity via Multicall3, and holders - run together, sharing a 2s window), verdict, total, in milliseconds. Total is never intended to exceed 4.0s: signal-gathering and the Jev-or-rules verdict are each bounded so their sum can't exceed that budget by construction, not because anything gets cancelled at the last moment - added 2026-09-28 after a real payment settled for an analysis whose client had already timed out.",
+  "type": "object"
+}

changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / description

Previous value: -"Jev-powered decision: avoid/caution/acceptable with a real probability."New value: +"avoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'jev' (a real Jev decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever Jev does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA."

changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / confidence / type
```
Previous value: -"number"New value: +[
+  "number",
+  "null"
+]
```
changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / probabilities / type
```
Previous value: -"object"New value: +[
+  "object",
+  "null"
+]
```
changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / probability / type
```
Previous value: -"number"New value: +[
+  "number",
+  "null"
+]
```

addedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / reason

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Only present when verdict_source is 'rules'.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / verdict_source

Added value: +{
+  "enum": [
+    "jev",
+    "rules"
+  ],
+  "type": "string"
+}

AddedSep 28, 2026

TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnly/openWorld/idempotent, and the description adds substantial context beyond them: what it reads (bytecode mint/blacklist/pause/tax powers, EIP-1967 proxy, renounced ownership, Uniswap v2/v3 and Aerodrome liquidity), the verdict format (avoid/caution/acceptable leading the response), and a disclosed limitation (holder concentration only when history fits 1-2 log queries). This is rich behavioral detail that is consistent with the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose, then supporting detail, closing with a concrete 'Try GET /token-risk/sample' pointer. It is dense and largely earns its space, though the 'no GoPlus, DexScreener or other vendor - real Base token safety' clause leans slightly promotional.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-param read tool with an output schema, the description needn't explain returns, yet it usefully previews the verdict and supplemental signals. Data sources, verdict structure, and a conditional-data caveat are all present; the only real omission is sibling-level routing guidance.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter at 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already fully documents the expected '0x + 40 hex chars' Base address. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, which is the baseline-3 case when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource and scope: 'Base token risk scan: on-chain rug check and honeypot-style flag detection for any ERC-20.' It names the exact asset class and the class of analysis, letting an agent distinguish it from generic siblings like base_call or base_proxy without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied ('for any ERC-20', 'real Base token safety') but there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance and no named alternative. The nearby sibling base_can-sell overlaps in intent, yet the description never picks a side or explains which to prefer, leaving routing to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All AgentIndex x402 tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.