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Token Risk

token_risk
Read-onlyIdempotent

Base token risk scan: on-chain rug check and honeypot-style flag detection for any ERC-20, no GoPlus, DexScreener or other vendor - real Base token safety. Reads bytecode for mint/blacklist/pause/tax powers, EIP-1967 proxy, renounced ownership, plus Uniswap v2/v3 and Aerodrome liquidity. A Jev avoid/caution/acceptable verdict leads the response, raw signals follow. Holder concentration included only when history fits 1-2 log queries. Try GET /token-risk/sample.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYesERC-20 contract address on Base to analyze (0x + 40 hex chars).

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYes
networkNo
verdictYesavoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'jev' (a real Jev decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever Jev does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA.
timing_msNosignals (bytecode+liquidity via Multicall3, and holders - run together, sharing a 2s window), verdict, total, in milliseconds. Total is never intended to exceed 4.0s: signal-gathering and the Jev-or-rules verdict are each bounded so their sum can't exceed that budget by construction, not because anything gets cancelled at the last moment - added 2026-09-28 after a real payment settled for an analysis whose client had already timed out.
x402_receiptNoBilling and provenance receipt for this call.
holders_analysisYesstatus: 'ok' (with distinct_holders/top10_pct_of_supply), 'skipped_established_token' (history too large to reconstruct in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls), or 'unavailable' (the 3-second per-stage budget was exceeded).
bytecode_analysisYesmint/blacklist/pause/tax flags, proxy and ownership status.
liquidity_analysisYesUniswap v2/v3 and Aerodrome pools found, with reserves.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed8 schema fields changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / holders_analysis / description
      Previous value: -"Top-10 holder concentration, or {\"status\": \"skipped_established_token\"} if the full transfer history does not provably fit in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls."New value: +"status: 'ok' (with distinct_holders/top10_pct_of_supply), 'skipped_established_token' (history too large to reconstruct in 1-2 eth_getLogs calls), or 'unavailable' (the 3-second per-stage budget was exceeded)."
    • addedOutput schema / properties / timing_ms
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "signals (bytecode+liquidity via Multicall3, and holders - run together, sharing a 2s window), verdict, total, in milliseconds. Total is never intended to exceed 4.0s: signal-gathering and the Jev-or-rules verdict are each bounded so their sum can't exceed that budget by construction, not because anything gets cancelled at the last moment - added 2026-09-28 after a real payment settled for an analysis whose client had already timed out.",
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / description
      Previous value: -"Jev-powered decision: avoid/caution/acceptable with a real probability."New value: +"avoid/caution/acceptable. verdict_source is 'jev' (a real Jev decision with a real probability) or 'rules' (deterministic mint/blacklist/pause/owner/liquidity check, probability/probabilities/confidence null) - used whenever Jev does not answer within 2 seconds, so the route always returns a verdict without ever waiting on an upstream with no SLA."
    • changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / confidence / type
      Previous value: -"number"New value: +[
      +  "number",
      +  "null"
      +]
    • changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / probabilities / type
      Previous value: -"object"New value: +[
      +  "object",
      +  "null"
      +]
    • changedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / probability / type
      Previous value: -"number"New value: +[
      +  "number",
      +  "null"
      +]
    • addedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / reason
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Only present when verdict_source is 'rules'.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / verdict / properties / verdict_source
      Added value: +{
      +  "enum": [
      +    "jev",
      +    "rules"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. Added

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, and idempotentHint. The description adds substantial behavioral context beyond that: it lists the exact bytecode checks (mint/blacklist/pause/tax powers, EIP-1967 proxy, renounced ownership), the liquidity sources, the verdict-led response shape, and the conditional inclusion of holder concentration. It does not cover rate limits or authentication requirements, but the read-only public nature makes those less critical.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core scan purpose and remains dense but readable across five sentences. Some phrasing is promotional ('real Base token safety') and the term 'Jev' is unexplained, but the sentences mostly earn their place and the key information comes early.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given one required parameter, 100% schema coverage, existing annotations, and an output schema, the description is largely complete. It explains what is analyzed, the response format, and a conditional behavior for holder concentration. It lacks explicit routing guidance relative to sibling tools, which is the main gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already documents the single address parameter as an ERC-20 contract address on Base. The description reinforces that the tool works for any ERC-20 on Base but adds no syntax, format, or constraint details beyond what the schema provides. The baseline of 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: on-chain rug check and honeypot-style flag detection for any ERC-20 on Base. It distinguishes itself from generic sibling tools and vendor alternatives like GoPlus or DexScreener, so an agent can tell what the tool does without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied for any ERC-20 on Base, and the sample endpoint is suggested. However, there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no when-not-to-use guidance, and no named alternatives among the sibling tools. The agent must infer the appropriate context from the tool name and description.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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