agent-health

agent_webhook_secret

Destructive

Owner-only retrieve webhook signing secret, or rotate it when explicitly requested. Keep the secret private. Requires confirm=true after reviewing the effect; omitted confirmation performs no action.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "agent_id": "<agent_id>",
      "api_key": "<api_key>"
    },
    "name": "agent_webhook_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`rotate`	No
`api_key`	Yes
`confirm`	No
`agent_id`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedOct 15, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / confirm

Added value: +{
+  "default": false,
+  "title": "Confirm",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}

First observedSep 9, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, but the description adds real value beyond them: owner-only authorization scope, a mandatory confirmation gate, the no-op default when confirm is omitted, and secrecy expectations. It stops short of describing consequences such as whether rotation invalidates the prior secret.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the primary action and modes, then the confirmation contract. No filler or repetition of structured data.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the description covers the critical auth and confirmation semantics. It is slightly short for a destructive 4-param tool because rotation consequences and the agent_id/api_key roles remain unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry param meaning. It clarifies confirm (must be true, omitted = no action) and indirectly the rotate flag, but leaves agent_id and api_key entirely unexplained, leaving half the surface undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource with both modes: 'retrieve webhook signing secret, or rotate it'. The resource (webhook signing secret) is unique among siblings such as test_agent_webhook and evidence_signing_keys, so an agent can identify the right tool without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly scopes rotation to 'when explicitly requested' and gates the call on 'confirm=true after reviewing the effect', plus notes the no-op behavior when confirmation is omitted. Both the when and the guard condition are stated rather than implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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