get_findings
List tools whose descriptions contain detected injection, concealment, or exfiltration patterns. Filter by severity: critical, high, medium, low.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| severity | No |
List tools whose descriptions contain detected injection, concealment, or exfiltration patterns. Filter by severity: critical, high, medium, low.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| severity | No |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the operation (listing and filtering) but does not mention return format, safety traits, or side effects. 'List' implies a read-only action, but explicit context is absent. It is not misleading, but not richly transparent either.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence that is front-loaded with the core purpose and includes essential filter details. No wasted words; every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple list tool with only two parameters and no output schema, the description covers the main purpose and filter. However, it does not clarify what the returned 'tools' list contains (e.g., names, metadata) or how limit behaves. This leaves minor but noticeable gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It does explain the severity parameter by listing its allowed values (critical, high, medium, low) and its filtering role. However, the 'limit' parameter is not described at all, leaving its meaning and use ambiguous.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a specific action: 'List tools whose descriptions contain detected injection, concealment, or exfiltration patterns.' This gives a verb, resource, and scope, and naturally distinguishes it from sibling tools like check_mcp_server or get_drift_feed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies use for finding security-related tool descriptions but provides no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives, nor any exclusions or prerequisites. It lacks the explicit alternatives that would earn a higher score.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool has a distinct purpose: check_mcp_server targets a single server for both changes and injection patterns, get_drift_feed scans the ecosystem for recently changed tools, and get_findings lists tools with detected patterns. No two tools are likely to be confused.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern using snake_case: check_mcp_server, get_drift_feed, get_findings. The verbs 'check' and 'get' are both action-oriented and appropriate, maintaining predictable naming.
Three tools is a compact but reasonable set for a monitoring server focused on MCP ecosystem changes and security. While slightly lean, each tool covers a core concern without redundancy.
The surface covers the primary monitoring actions: checking a specific server, browsing ecosystem drift, and retrieving findings. A minor gap is the lack of a detailed drill-down for why a specific server is flagged beyond the initial verdict, but workflows are still functional.