x402-encrypt-aes256gcm
Encrypt Aes256gcm: Encrypt Aes256gcm
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | No | Key to process | |
| text | No | Text to process | |
| input | No | Input to process | |
| secret | No | Secret to process |
Encrypt Aes256gcm: Encrypt Aes256gcm
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | No | Key to process | |
| text | No | Text to process | |
| input | No | Input to process | |
| secret | No | Secret to process |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / inputAdded value: +{
+ "description": "Input to process",
+ "type": "string"
+}Input schema / properties / keyAdded value: +{
+ "description": "Key to process",
+ "type": "string"
+}Input schema / properties / secretAdded value: +{
+ "description": "Secret to process",
+ "type": "string"
+}Input schema / properties / textAdded value: +{
+ "description": "Text to process",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden and delivers none of it. It does not disclose whether the operation is deterministic, how the nonce/IV is handled, what encoding the ciphertext is returned in, or whether the key must be raw bytes vs. hex/base64 — all critical for AES-256-GCM.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is short, but the brevity comes from duplicating the title rather than from efficient information density. No sentence earns its place because the same four words appear twice.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an encryption tool with four ambiguous parameters, no annotations, and no output schema, the description is completely inadequate: it explains neither input expected format, key handling, nor return value. An agent could not reliably invoke this tool from the definition alone.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Nominal schema coverage is 100%, but every description is meaningless boilerplate ("Key to process", "Text to process", "Input to process", "Secret to process"), so the schema disambiguates nothing. With four overlapping parameters — two of which ('key', 'secret') could both be the key and two ('text', 'input') could both be the plaintext — the description provides no clarification at all, leaving the agent unable to map arguments correctly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description is a pure tautology: it repeats the tool name twice ("Encrypt Aes256gcm: Encrypt Aes256gcm") without stating a verb-plus-resource objective in any meaningful way. An agent can guess it encrypts with AES-256-GCM from the name alone, but the description adds nothing, and it makes no attempt to distinguish itself from the sibling 'x402-decrypt-aes256gcm'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance, no mention of the decrypt counterpart, and no prerequisites (key/nonce requirements) for a cryptographic operation. Nothing in the text tells the agent under what conditions this tool should be chosen over alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.