wallet_delegation
Is this EOA secretly running someone else's code? — Since Pectra an EOA can carry EIP-7702 delegated code (the 0xef0100 designator): every call to the wallet executes the DELEGATE's contract with the wallet's funds — a malicious delegate is total takeover, invisible to approval tools. Reads the designator, resolves the delegate and verdicts it: not_delegated / delegated_known (Coinbase's EOA→SmartWallet path) / delegated_unknown (🚨) / smart_contract. The drain surface no other Base tool checks. Required input: wallet. Priced $0.03 per call over x402 on Base; send a prepaid x-credit-token header for unlimited calls (no free tier on this tool). No API key required.
Tool call template
Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.
{
"id": 1,
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"arguments": {
"wallet": "<wallet>"
},
"name": "wallet_delegation"
}
}Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | Yes | EOA address |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description. | |
| service | No | The service id that answered. | |
| checkedAt | No | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the underlying reads were taken. |