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wallet_delegation

Read-onlyIdempotent

Is this EOA secretly running someone else's code? β€” Since Pectra an EOA can carry EIP-7702 delegated code (the 0xef0100 designator): every call to the wallet executes the DELEGATE's contract with the wallet's funds β€” a malicious delegate is total takeover, invisible to approval tools. Reads the designator, resolves the delegate and verdicts it: not_delegated / delegated_known (Coinbase's EOAβ†’SmartWallet path) / delegated_unknown (🚨) / smart_contract. The drain surface no other Base tool checks. Required input: wallet. Priced $0.03 per call over x402 on Base; send a prepaid x-credit-token header for unlimited calls, or get 1 free call/day per tool. No wallet or API key required.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
walletYesEOA address

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNoThe result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description.
serviceNoThe service id that answered.
checkedAtNoISO-8601 timestamp of when the underlying reads were taken.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / data / description
      Previous value: -"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the service description above."New value: +"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedOutput schema / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "data"
      -]
  3. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds substantial behavioral detail beyond the readOnly and idempotent annotations: it explains the 0xef0100 designator, delegate execution with wallet funds, the four possible verdicts, and the fact that this is a unique check among Base tools. No contradiction with annotations exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and front-loaded with purpose and risk context. Pricing and header details add practical invocation context but are somewhat tangential to tool selection. Overall it is appropriately sized and structured for a single-parameter security check.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Annotations cover safety/read-only traits, the input schema documents the only parameter, an output schema exists, and the description supplies purpose, unique value, verdict categories, required field, and auth/pricing constraints. Nothing necessary for correct selection or invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 100% schema description coverage, the schema already documents 'wallet' as an EOA address. The description only repeats 'Required input: wallet' and adds no new constraints or formatting details, so it meets the baseline without adding much semantic value.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a concrete, domain-specific purpose: detecting EIP-7702 delegated code on an EOA and classifying the result into explicit verdicts. It clearly names the resource (wallet delegation) and distinguishes itself from siblings by claiming 'The drain surface no other Base tool checks.'

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description frames the use case as a security investigation ('Is this EOA secretly running someone else's code?') and states that no wallet or API key is required. It implies when to prefer this tool over approval-focused tools, though it stops short of naming alternatives or explicit exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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