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safe_check

Read-onlyIdempotent

Real M-of-N multisig, or a 1-of-1 that just looks like one? — Multisig / treasury intelligence. Given an address: is it a Gnosis Safe, its owners and M-of-N threshold, version, activity, and — critically — its enabled MODULES. A module can move the Safe's funds via execTransactionFromModule with no owner signatures, so each one is an address with unilateral control. Returns a multisig / single_signer / has_modules verdict: the counterparty check before you trust funds to a multisig. address= required. Not financial advice. Required input: address. Priced $0.04 per call over x402 on Base; send a prepaid x-credit-token header for unlimited calls (no free tier on this tool). No API key required.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYesAddress to check

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNoThe result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description.
serviceNoThe service id that answered.
checkedAtNoISO-8601 timestamp of when the underlying reads were taken.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / data / description
      Previous value: -"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the service description above."New value: +"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedOutput schema / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "data"
      -]
  3. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover readOnly/idempotent/openWorld, but the description adds genuine behavioral context: modules can move funds via execTransactionFromModule with no owner signatures, the possible verdict values, and the auth/pricing model ($0.04 via x402, prepaid x-credit-token header, no API key, no free tier). That is exactly the extra layer annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The hook and risk explanation are front-loaded effectively, but the text repeats the required input ('address= required' and again 'Required input: address'), and marketing flourishes ('critically', 'Not financial advice') dilute an otherwise tight description.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists and the description still names the verdict values, so an agent has everything needed: input, semantics, risk interpretation, and cost/auth. Nothing material is missing for a single-param read tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter and schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description restates 'address= required' twice but adds no syntax, format, or resolution detail beyond what the schema already provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States the exact verb+resource: given an address, determine whether it is a Gnosis Safe and report owners, M-of-N threshold, version, activity, and enabled modules, plus a multisig/single_signer/has_modules verdict. This is clearly distinguishable from siblings like safe_to_send, safe_approve, contract_owner or address_check.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Frames the use case explicitly as 'the counterparty check before you trust funds to a multisig', including the risk model (modules with unilateral control). It gives clear context for when to run it but does not name alternative tools or say when not to use it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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