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contract_danger

Read-onlyIdempotent

What can the owner do to you? — Reads a verified contract's ABI and flags owner-callable abuse functions: mint (dilute), pause (freeze exit), blacklist (block your wallet), setFee/setTax (tax you after entry), withdraw/sweep (pull funds), upgrade (swap logic). An unverified contract is itself a red flag. Diligence a price feed can't give. Required input: address. Priced $0.04 per call over x402 on Base; send a prepaid x-credit-token header for unlimited calls (no free tier on this tool). No API key required.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressYesContract address

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNoThe result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description.
serviceNoThe service id that answered.
checkedAtNoISO-8601 timestamp of when the underlying reads were taken.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / data / description
      Previous value: -"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the service description above."New value: +"The result payload. Shape is service-specific; every field is documented in the tool description."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedOutput schema / required
      Removed value: -[
      -  "data"
      -]
  3. Added

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, open-world), so the bar is lower, and the description adds genuinely useful operational context the annotations cannot: pricing ($0.04/call over x402 on Base), the prepaid x-credit-token header for unlimited calls, no free tier, and no API key required. It also warns that an unverified contract is itself a red flag, which frames result interpretation. It does not describe latency, rate limits, or failure modes.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core capability is front-loaded in the first sentence, and the parenthetical abuse-function list is dense and information-bearing rather than filler. The cost/access sentence is necessary given the paid model. The rhetorical hook and "Diligence a price feed can't give" are light marketing that slightly dilutes an otherwise tight block.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-address read tool with annotations and an output schema present, the description supplies purpose, the abuse categories flagged, payment mechanics, and required input — nothing an agent needs to call it is missing. The one residual gap is the absence of any routing signal against sibling risk-scan tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already carries the contract ("Contract address"). The description restates "Required input: address" without adding format, checksum, or chain-scoping detail. Baseline 3 applies when structured data does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: "Reads a verified contract's ABI and flags owner-callable abuse functions," followed by a concrete taxonomy (mint/pause/blacklist/setFee/withdraw/upgrade). An agent immediately knows the output class. However, it never distinguishes itself from close siblings like owner_powers, ai_contract_risk, or contract_owner, so sibling selection is left to guesswork.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Framing ("What can the owner do to you?", "Diligence a price feed can't give") implies the use case is pre-interaction contract due diligence, and "An unverified contract is itself a red flag" hints at the trigger condition. But there is no explicit when-not guidance and no named alternative among the many overlapping risk tools (owner_powers, rug_score, token_risk), so usage is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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