dependency_provenance_assessment
Fail closed on empty dependency sets or absent registry policy; distinguish digest declarations from verified provenance; 0.003 USDC.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | Yes | ||
| dependencies | Yes |
Fail closed on empty dependency sets or absent registry policy; distinguish digest declarations from verified provenance; 0.003 USDC.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | Yes | ||
| dependencies | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / examplesAdded value: +[
+ {
+ "dependencies": [
+ {
+ "digest": "sha256:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+ "name": "example",
+ "source": "registry",
+ "version": "1.0.0"
+ }
+ ],
+ "policy": {
+ "allowed_registries": [
+ "registry"
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+]Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does add real behavioral context: it fails closed on empty dependency sets or missing registry policy, and it will not treat a digest declaration as proof of provenance. The USDC price is also disclosed. It stops short of error modes, permissions, or result shape, so it is useful but incomplete.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight clauses with the fail-closed constraint front-loaded and no filler; the cost disclosure is useful for an agent weighing invocation. It is terse to the point of under-specification, but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with a nested policy object, an array capped at 1000 dependencies, no annotations, no output schema, and zero schema descriptions, the definition is far too thin. An agent cannot tell what 'verified provenance' means operationally or how policy violations are reported.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% across two required parameters, and the policy object is nested with a required allowed_registries field documented only in a bare example. The description alludes to empty dependency sets and absent registry policy but never explains dependency fields (name/digest/source/version) or how allowed_registries gates them, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description conveys that this tool assesses dependency provenance with fail-closed semantics and distinguishes declared digests from verified provenance, which is more than a restatement of the name. However, it never states the core action plainly (e.g., 'verify dependency provenance against a registry policy'), and with 30+ siblings the agent gets no crisp differentiator beyond the name itself.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no alternatives named despite a crowded sibling set (mcp_server_identity_evidence, domain_ownership_evidence, mcp_manifest_firewall). The agent must infer when this preflight is appropriate versus those tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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