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BRAINIAC SOAP Security

Audit SOAP security policy

soap-security_soap-security-policy-audit
Read-onlyIdempotent

Compare WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy assertions across caller-supplied WSDL 1.1 bindings and operations. audit_status is valid, warnings, policy_conflicts, invalid, or incomplete. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. A declared policy is not evidence that a server enforces it. Imports are not fetched. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/soap-security/soap-security-policy-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "documents": "<documents>"
    },
    "name": "soap-security_soap-security-policy-audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
expectedNoexpected, object. Optional.
documentsYesdocuments, array. Required.
selectionNoselection, object. Optional.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
findingsNofindings. Array.
risk_levelNorisk_level. String.
limitationsNolimitations. Array.
audit_statusNoaudit_status. String.
policy_conflictsNopolicy_conflicts. Array.
missing_requirementsNomissing_requirements. Array.
unresolved_referencesNounresolved_references. Array.
unsupported_assertionsNounsupported_assertions. Array.
operation_security_profilesNooperation_security_profiles. Array.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint and destructiveHint=false, but the description goes well beyond them: it names the audit_status and risk_level value sets so the caller can read results, warns that declared policy is not proof of enforcement, states imports are not resolved, and discloses the full commercial/auth flow (price, endpoint, and that an unpaid call returns x402 terms without running). That is exactly the context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then the status vocabulary, then caveats, then the commercial terms — a sensible order with almost no filler. The enumerated value lists for audit_status and risk_level are somewhat redundant given an output schema exists, which keeps it from a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, the description need not explain return shapes, and it correctly spends its words on the payment gate, non-fetching of imports, and the declared-vs-enforced caveat. The remaining gap is the absence of any differentiation from soap-security_policy-strength, which matters given both audit SOAP security policy.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter, enum and pattern is already documented structurally; baseline is 3. The description adds only the framing that the WSDL 1.1 bindings and operations are caller-supplied, without clarifying how the optional 'expected' object is matched against discovered policy or how 'selection' narrows scope beyond the schema's own field names.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Compare WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy assertions across caller-supplied WSDL 1.1 bindings and operations.' That is far more precise than the title alone. It does not, however, name or contrast the sibling soap-security_policy-strength, so an agent must infer which of the two audit-style tools to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description supplies real interpretive context ('A declared policy is not evidence that a server enforces it') and a scope limitation ('Imports are not fetched'), which help an agent decide whether the tool answers its question. It gives no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use rule and never routes the agent to the sibling tool, so guidance is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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