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BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence

Detect extension/format mismatches

file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect

Identify mismatches between caller-supplied filenames/extensions and local magic-byte formats, including double extensions. Price $0.03 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/file-extension-mismatch-detect. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
csvNo
asOfNo
fileNo
jsonNo
textNo
filesNo
reportsNo
artifactsNo
maxArchiveDepthNo
maxInflateBytesNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description must carry the behavioral burden; it does disclose the billing gate ($0.03 USDC, 402 on unpaid calls, no execution) and clarifies that comparison is against local magic bytes rather than any remote lookup. It says nothing about read-only nature, batch limits, archive-depth or inflate caps, or what happens to files that cannot be inspected.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core detection purpose, followed by price and endpoint, then the payment failure mode. No filler; the only mild inefficiency is that endpoint and price could be considered structured metadata rather than description content.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 10-parameter tool with nested objects and no output schema, the description omits how input is supplied (single file vs files/artifacts arrays, csv/text payloads), what the response looks like, and how detection interacts with archive expansion limits. It covers purpose and billing but not enough to call the tool correctly on first try.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 10 parameters, including nested file/artifact objects, so the description would need to compensate. It only implies that a filename and file content are used; csv, json, text, reports, asOf, maxArchiveDepth and maxInflateBytes are never mentioned, leaving their roles to guesswork.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: identifying mismatches between caller-supplied filename/extension and local magic-byte format, with the notable extra case of double extensions. This is concrete enough to separate it from siblings like executable-metadata-analyze or macro-document-risk-detect, though it never names an alternative explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to choose this tool over the other file-security detectors, nor on prerequisites such as needing file bytes to compare against the extension. The only operational guidance is the payment rule (unpaid calls return 402 and do not run), which is transactional rather than selection guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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