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BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence

Analyze executable metadata

file-security_executable-metadata-analyze

Analyze PE/ELF/Mach-O metadata and structural properties from caller-supplied bytes. Static only—files are never executed. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/executable-metadata-analyze. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "file-security_executable-metadata-analyze"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
csvNo
asOfNo
fileNo
jsonNo
textNo
filesNo
reportsNo
artifactsNo
maxArchiveDepthNo
maxInflateBytesNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full burden and does disclose genuinely non-obvious behavior: analysis is static and files are never executed, the call costs $0.04 USDC, and unpaid calls fail with 402 without running. It omits what the response contains, how multiple inputs are combined, and how archive depth/inflate caps behave.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, purpose front-loaded, no filler prose. The POST path largely restates the tool name and is the one element that does not earn its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 10-parameter tool with nested objects, no annotations, and no output schema, the definition explains purpose, safety, and cost but leaves the agent without guidance on which input shape to populate or what limits apply. An agent could call it correctly only by guessing at the schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 10 parameters including nested file objects, so the description must compensate and largely does not. 'Caller-supplied bytes' hints at the base64 file payloads, but nothing explains file vs files vs artifacts vs reports vs csv/json/text, nor the maxArchiveDepth and maxInflateBytes knobs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (Analyze), a specific resource (PE/ELF/Mach-O metadata and structural properties), and a scope constraint (caller-supplied bytes). Naming the three executable formats implicitly separates it from the archive, macro, and script siblings, though no sibling is called out by name.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no statement of when to choose this tool over file-security_malware-indicator-extract or the format-specific detectors, nor any prerequisites. 'Static only' implies a class of use but is a safety property, not routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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