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BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence

Detect archive payload risk

file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect

Inspect caller-supplied archives for nested members and risky file types with strict depth/size/decompression limits. Contents are never executed or uploaded to scanners. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/archive-payload-risk-detect. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
csvNo
asOfNo
fileNo
jsonNo
textNo
filesNo
reportsNo
artifactsNo
maxArchiveDepthNo
maxInflateBytesNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden well: it discloses that contents are never executed or uploaded, that strict depth/size/decompression limits apply, that the call costs $0.05 USDC, and that unpaid calls return 402 without running. It does not cover authentication/permission requirements or return-value behavior, but the safety and payment behavior are unusually clear for a no-annotation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loads the core purpose, followed by safety, pricing, endpoint, and payment-failure behavior. Every sentence adds actionable information, with no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a complex tool with 10 parameters, nested objects, zero schema description coverage, no output schema, and no annotations, so the description should do much more. It adequately explains purpose and some behavior, but leaves the input contract and expected return values largely undocumented, making correct invocation difficult without opening the schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There are 10 parameters with 0% schema description coverage, and the description explains almost none of them. It hints at archive payloads and depth/size/decompression limits, which loosely map to some parameters, but it does not clarify 'file' vs 'files' vs 'artifacts', 'reports', 'csv', 'json', 'text', or 'asOf', nor does it tell the agent which inputs are required or how to supply the archive itself.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Inspect') and resource ('caller-supplied archives') and names the risks it looks for ('nested members and risky file types'). The archive scope clearly separates it from sibling detectors such as macro-document or executable-metadata analyzers, though it does not explicitly name or contrast those alternatives.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the archive-specific scope: an agent can infer this is the tool for archives rather than other file-security scans. However, there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no when-not-to-use condition, and no named alternative among the sibling tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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