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BRAINIAC Email & Communication Security

Detect BEC patterns

email-security_bec-pattern-detect

Detect Business Email Compromise patterns such as payment-change language, executive persona cues, external Reply-To, and lookalike sender domains from supplied mail. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/email-security/bec-pattern-detect. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "email-security_bec-pattern-detect"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
csvNo
emlNo
asOfNo
fileNo
jsonNo
textNo
urlsNo
filesNo
emailsNo
headersNo
urlHopsNo
publicDnsNo
attachmentsNo
brandDomainsNo
companyNamesNo
conversationsNo
dkimSelectorsNo
followPublicUrlsNo
authenticationResultsNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description does carry real operational context: price ($0.05 USDC), endpoint, and that unpaid calls return 402 without running — a meaningful pre-execution fact. However, it says nothing about the response shape (no output schema exists), determinism, or which of the many input modes actually triggers analysis, leaving material behavior undisclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the detection purpose, followed by pricing and payment-failure behavior. No filler; the commercial and 402 details each serve a purpose, though the raw endpoint path is of marginal use to an agent.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 19-parameter, deeply nested tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers only purpose and payment semantics. It omits how inputs combine, what the result contains, and how findings are reported, which is not enough for an agent to call it confidently.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There are 19 parameters with 0% schema description coverage, so the description must compensate and largely does not. 'From supplied mail' loosely gestures at eml/emails/text/conversations but gives no guidance on csv, json, files, attachments, urls, urlHops, brandDomains, companyNames, asOf, publicDns, dkimSelectors, or followPublicUrls — including the key ambiguity of which inputs are alternatives versus combinable.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (Detect) and a specific resource (BEC patterns) and enumerates the concrete signals checked: payment-change language, executive persona cues, external Reply-To, lookalike sender domains. That enumeration differentiates it reasonably from siblings like spoofing-detect or domain-impersonation-check, though it never explicitly states the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied by 'from supplied mail' — an agent can infer it analyzes email content for compromise indicators. There is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or named alternative among the seven sibling detection tools, so routing between similar detectors is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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