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BRAINIAC Email & Communication Security

Analyze email attachment risk

email-security_attachment-risk-analyze

Inspect caller-supplied attachment filenames, metadata, and local magic-byte structures for suspicious patterns. No external sandbox or scanner is used. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/email-security/attachment-risk-analyze. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "email-security_attachment-risk-analyze"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
csvNo
emlNo
asOfNo
fileNo
jsonNo
textNo
urlsNo
filesNo
emailsNo
headersNo
urlHopsNo
publicDnsNo
attachmentsNo
brandDomainsNo
companyNamesNo
conversationsNo
dkimSelectorsNo
followPublicUrlsNo
authenticationResultsNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the burden and does well on the operational side: it discloses the price ($0.04 USDC), the payment gating behavior (unpaid calls return 402 and do not run), and the analysis boundary (no external sandbox/scanner). It omits read-only/security posture, rate limits, and output characteristics, but the payment and no-side-effect details are the highest-value disclosures.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Five short sentences, front-loaded with the purpose before cost and transport details, with no filler. The endpoint path and price are operationally required for a pay-per-call API, so they earn their place, though the raw POST path is marginally redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 19 nested parameters, zero required fields, no annotations, and no output schema, the description is far too thin. It never explains what an acceptable minimal call looks like, which input variants are mutually exclusive, or what the response contains, so an agent cannot reliably construct a valid invocation from the definition alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 19 parameters, so the description must compensate and largely fails to. It hints that attachments (filenames, metadata, bytes) are the relevant input, but says nothing about the many alternative body inputs (csv, eml, json, text, urls, emails, conversations, headers, authenticationResults) that dominate the schema, leaving an agent unable to choose the right payload shape.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Inspect') and a specific resource scope ('attachment filenames, metadata, and local magic-byte structures') with a stated goal ('suspicious patterns'). Sibling names like url-chain-analyze or header-forensics are clearly distinct domains, but the description never names a sibling to differentiate against, so it stops short of 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The line 'No external sandbox or scanner is used' implicitly scopes the tool to static/local analysis rather than detonation, which is a useful usage boundary. However there is no explicit when-to-use or when-to-prefer-an-alternative guidance, and no mention of what inputs are appropriate versus other email-security tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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