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BRAINIAC Cybersecurity Intelligence

Get vulnerability details

cybersecurity-intelligence_vulnerability

Retrieve details for a CVE or vulnerability ID from OSV, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, and NVD. Price $0.02 USDC. POST /api/v1/cybersecurity-intelligence/vulnerability. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "cveId": "<cveId>"
    },
    "name": "cybersecurity-intelligence_vulnerability"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cveIdYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations at all, the description carries the full burden and does disclose non-obvious operational facts: a $0.02 USDC price, the POST endpoint, and that unpaid calls return 402 without executing. That is meaningful behavioral disclosure beyond what structured fields provide. It does not describe the shape or breadth of the returned data (severity, exploit status, EPSS score), which leaves a gap for a tool with no output schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, front-loaded with what the tool returns and its sources, followed by cost and failure semantics. Nothing is padded, though the raw endpoint path adds little for an agent that only invokes the tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter tool with no annotations and no output schema, the definition covers sourcing, cost, and failure behavior adequately. It is incomplete on what the response contains and on accepted identifier formats, which are the remaining things an agent needs to use it confidently.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description should compensate. The phrase 'CVE or vulnerability ID' does add real meaning over the bare cveId string, signalling that non-CVE identifiers (e.g., GHSA/PYSEC style) may be accepted. However, no format example or length guidance is given, so an agent still guesses at valid input syntax.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Uses a specific verb (Retrieve) and resource (details for a CVE or vulnerability ID) and names the four upstream sources (OSV, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, NVD), which tells an agent this is a per-vulnerability lookup rather than the package/repository tools in the sibling set. It stops short of explicitly contrasting itself with a package-level checker, so it is clear but not maximally differentiated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no statement of when to use this tool versus the package- or repo-scoped siblings, and no prerequisites beyond the payment note. An agent must infer from the required cveId parameter that this is the CVE-centric lookup.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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