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BRAINIAC Crypto Security

Verify transaction intent

crypto-security_transaction-intent-verify

Compare an EVM transaction's calldata and native value with the action declared in the request. Decoding uses the ABI in the request, or the standard ERC-20 transfer, transferFrom, approve, and increaseAllowance encodings when that selector matches. intent_match is true, false, or the string indeterminate when a declared field cannot be checked. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. This is static analysis: it does not read chain state, simulate the call, or decide that a contract is malicious or that the transaction will succeed. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/crypto-security/transaction-intent-verify. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "chainId": "<chainId>",
      "contractAddress": "<contractAddress>",
      "calldata": "<calldata>",
      "value": "<value>",
      "expectedAction": "<expectedAction>"
    },
    "name": "crypto-security_transaction-intent-verify"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
abiNo
valueYes
chainIdYes
calldataYes
expectedNo
expectedActionYes
contractAddressYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does a solid job: it discloses the analytical limits (no chain state, no simulation, no maliciousness verdict), the pricing ($0.04 USDC), the payment behavior (unpaid calls return 402 and do not run), and the endpoint. Not covered: rate limits, idempotency, or latency expectations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core comparison, then output semantics, then limitations, then pricing and payment behavior, in a tight sequence of short sentences. There is no filler; even the endpoint and price statements carry operational weight.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex, nested, 7-parameter tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description covers the essentials: what is compared, how decoding resolves, what the two result fields can contain, and what the tool will not tell you. The remaining gap is the unexplained optional `expected` sub-fields, which the agent must interpret from names alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 7 parameters, so the description must compensate and it only partly does. It adds real semantic value by explaining that decoding uses the request's ABI or falls back to standard ERC-20 transfer/transferFrom/approve/increaseAllowance when the selector matches, which is not derivable from the schema. However, the nested `expected` object's seven fields (token, amount, spender, contract, recipient, nativeValue, functionName) and chainId/value receive no explanation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: compare an EVM transaction's calldata and native value against the action declared in the request. That is concrete and immediately actionable. It does not, however, differentiate itself from the listed siblings (intent-safety, proxy-upgrade-storage-audit, storage-slot-grade), leaving sibling routing to inference from names alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives useful negative guidance: it is static analysis, does not read chain state, does not simulate the call, and does not decide whether a contract is malicious. Those exclusions effectively tell the agent when this tool is the wrong choice. What is missing is an explicit positive 'use this when...' statement or a named alternative for simulative/maliciousness checks.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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