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BRAINIAC Crypto Security

Score transaction intent safety

crypto-security_intent-safety

Read a caller-supplied EVM transaction or an EIP-712 typed-data message and describe the transfer, approval, permit, or outer call it encodes. Known selectors are transfer, transferFrom, approve, increaseAllowance, setApprovalForAll, permit, multicall, aggregate, and execute. The score is a local penalty count. It does not simulate the call or read a chain. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/crypto-security/intent-safety. Unpaid calls return 402 and do not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "crypto-security_intent-safety"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
typed_dataNo
transactionNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description does unusually well: it discloses the price ($0.04 USDC), the POST endpoint, that the score is a local penalty count rather than a simulation, and that unpaid calls return 402 without running. Missing details are the return shape and any auth or rate-limit facts.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Six short sentences, front-loaded with the core action and followed by supported selectors, scoring semantics, limits, and payment terms. The selector enumeration is long but earns its place, since it defines the tool's coverage; nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a decoder with a nested two-shape input, no annotation coverage, and no output schema, the definition covers behavior well but leaves the caller guessing at the actual response structure beyond 'a score' and a description. The input-alternative rule also stays implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the load; it does map the two top-level inputs (a transaction or an EIP-712 typed-data message), which is genuinely useful. However it never says whether exactly one must be supplied, and it adds nothing about the nested typed_data fields such as primaryType, domain, or message.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it reads a caller-supplied EVM transaction or EIP-712 typed-data message and describes the transfer, approval, permit, or outer call it encodes, plus a local penalty score. That is far more specific than the name; the only gap is that it never states how it differs from the sibling crypto-security_transaction-intent-verify.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It communicates the scope of the analysis by listing the known selectors it understands, and it clearly excludes simulation and on-chain reads, which is useful. But it never says when to pick this over crypto-security_transaction-intent-verify, nor whether the two inputs are alternatives or mutually exclusive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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