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BRAINIAC Application & Pipeline Security Checks

Audit OAuth/OIDC client registration

appsec-config_oauth-client-audit
Read-onlyIdempotent

Check client settings against RFC 9700 security BCP. Price $0.02 USDC. POST /api/v1/appsec-config/oauth-client-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "client": "<client>"
    },
    "name": "appsec-config_oauth-client-audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
clientYesclient, object. Required.
broadScopesNobroadScopes, array. Optional.
maxAccessTokenLifetimeSecondsNomaxAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds, integer, from -9007199254740991 to 9007199254740991. Optional.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sourcesNosources. Array.
findingsNofindings. Array.
limitationsNolimitations. Array.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely non-obvious behavior: the $0.02 USDC price and the x402 payment-gate semantics where an unpaid call returns payment terms instead of executing. It stops short of describing what the audit result contains or how findings are graded.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences with the purpose front-loaded ahead of cost and transport details. The raw POST path is arguably redundant with the structured tool definition, but nothing is padded or vague.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only audit with a rich, fully described nested input schema and an output schema, the description covers purpose, standard, cost, and failure mode. An agent could call it correctly; the only gap is that it does not preview what the audit checks or how severe findings appear.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and every nested field of the client object is documented in the schema, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description only alludes to 'client settings' generically and adds no meaning about how broadScopes or maxAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds affect the audit; baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Check client settings against RFC 9700 security BCP') and grounds it in a named standard, so an agent knows this audits OAuth/OIDC client registration rather than inspecting tokens (jwt-inspect) or evaluating passwords. It does not explicitly contrast itself with those siblings, which keeps it at 4 rather than 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the topic and by the payment precondition ('An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run'), which tells the agent what happens on an unfunded call. There is no explicit when-to-use vs. when-not-to-use guidance and no statement of prerequisites beyond payment.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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