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BRAINIAC Application & Pipeline Security Checks

Audit GitHub Actions workflows

appsec-config_github-actions-audit
Read-onlyIdempotent

Find injection, pinning, permission and pull_request_target risks. Price $0.03 USDC. POST /api/v1/appsec-config/github-actions-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "files": "<files>"
    },
    "name": "appsec-config_github-actions-audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
filesYesfiles, array. Required.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sourcesNosources. Array.
findingsNofindings. Array.
limitationsNolimitations. Array.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only, idempotent, non-destructive and open-world behavior, and the description adds genuinely new operational facts: a $0.03 USDC price, the POST endpoint, and the x402 rule that an unpaid call returns payment terms without running the audit. What is still missing is any hint of result volume or runtime for large file sets.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three compact sentences, front-loaded with what is detected, then cost, then transport, then the payment gate. Telegraphic style ("Price $0.03 USDC.") is efficient rather than padded, though the endpoint string could be considered redundant with structured metadata.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is a stateless read-only analyzer with an output schema supplied, rich annotations, and full schema coverage, so the description need not explain return values. Adding price, endpoint and the unpaid-call behavior closes the remaining gap an agent would hit at first invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single `files` array and schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents path and content. The description adds nothing about what `content` should be (raw workflow YAML?), how many files are acceptable, or how the 2MB per-file limit relates to practical input. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb ("Find") and enumerates the exact risk classes checked: injection, pinning, permission and pull_request_target. Combined with the GitHub-Actions-specific framing it is distinguishable from siblings like gitlab-ci-audit, though it never explicitly names an alternative.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent infers it should call this when it holds GitHub Actions workflow files to audit. There is no when-not guidance, no prerequisites, and no routing to the sibling auditors (gitlab-ci, injection-sink-scan) that overlap in risk coverage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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