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BRAINIAC Application & Pipeline Security Checks

Analyse AWS IAM policy documents

appsec-config_aws-iam-policy-analyze
Read-onlyIdempotent

Find wildcards, NotAction pitfalls, privilege-escalation actions and public principals. Price $0.03 USDC. POST /api/v1/appsec-config/aws-iam-policy-analyze. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "policy": "<policy>"
    },
    "name": "appsec-config_aws-iam-policy-analyze"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
policyYespolicy, value. Required.
policyTypeNopolicyType, string, one of identity, resource, trust. Required.identity

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sourcesNosources. Array.
findingsNofindings. Array.
limitationsNolimitations. Array.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely non-structured operational context: the $0.03 USDC cost, the POST endpoint, and crucially that an unpaid call returns x402 payment terms and does not execute — an agent would otherwise misinterpret an empty result as a clean policy.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the substantive detection list, then the cost/endpoint, then the payment-failure behavior. Every sentence carries information; only the truncated endpoint notation is slightly clipped rather than wasteful.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be explained, annotations cover safety, and the schema documents both parameters. The description supplies exactly the missing piece an agent cannot get from structured fields — the payment gate and its failure mode — making the definition complete for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters carry descriptions plus an enum for policyType, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds no guidance on what the policy string versus object form should contain, or how policyType=trust differs from identity/resource in terms of findings — baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a concrete resource (AWS IAM policy documents) and enumerates the specific findings it produces: wildcards, NotAction pitfalls, privilege-escalation actions, public principals. That list distinguishes it from the neighboring GCP IAM binding analyzer and from the config-audit siblings without needing to reference them by name.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer it should call this when it has an AWS IAM policy to inspect. There is no explicit when-to-use framing, no prerequisites (e.g. what policy formats are accepted beyond the schema's string-or-object anyOf), and no named alternative for adjacent cases such as GCP IAM or general CloudFormation review.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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