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BRAINIAC Application & Pipeline Security Checks

Audit Apache httpd configuration

appsec-config_apache-config-audit
Read-onlyIdempotent

Find weak TLS, directory listing, TRACE and missing hardening. Price $0.03 USDC. POST /api/v1/appsec-config/apache-config-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "content": "<content>"
    },
    "name": "appsec-config_apache-config-audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindNokind, string, one of httpd.conf, htaccess. Required.httpd.conf
contentYescontent, string, length 0 to 2000000. Required.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
notesNonotes. Array.
sourcesNosources. Array.
findingsNofindings. Array.
limitationsNolimitations. Array.
unknownDirectivesNounknownDirectives. Array.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered by structured data. The description adds genuinely new behavior: a $0.03 USDC price gate and the fact that an unpaid call returns x402 payment terms without executing. That payment/auth detail is exactly the kind of context annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with what the tool finds, followed by price, endpoint, and the unpaid-call caveat. No filler sentences. The raw POST path is slightly operational rather than agent-facing, but it is short.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and the monetary gate is fully disclosed. What remains unstated is how the two supported file kinds differ in results, but that is a minor omission for a two-parameter audit tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both `kind` and `content` are already documented with enum values and size limits. The description adds nothing about how `kind` (httpd.conf vs htaccess) affects the audit or what content should be supplied, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (audit) and resource (Apache httpd config) and enumerates the concrete findings it produces: weak TLS, directory listing, TRACE, missing hardening. That is far beyond restating the title. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the nginx-config-audit sibling, which is the main remaining gap.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The list of checks implies the use case (pre-deployment or periodic hardening review of Apache configs), but there is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or routing to alternatives such as nginx-config-audit for other servers. Usage must be inferred from the check list.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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