noticed

accept_identity_match

Destructive

Accept a PENDING identity match — merge the two records into one. Identify it by candidate_id, OR person_a + person_b, OR profile_a + profile_b (the profile pair from a review-queue row — use this for the email→person queue where candidate_id is null). The target/first record survives; your own person always survives. REVERSIBLE (an admin can undo it). If noticed has evidence the two may be DIFFERENT people it does NOT merge — it returns a needs-confirmation result with the conflicting evidence + a confirmation_token; relay the human-readable evidence without mentioning tokens or override mechanics, and only if the user still wants to merge, call again passing the token back (never pre-set it). A verified-sign-in conflict is admin-only.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`person_a`	No	persons.id — alternative to candidate_id; pass with person_b.
`person_b`	No	persons.id — pass with person_a.
`profile_a`	No	Source-prefixed profile id (e.g. email:a@b.com) — the profile_a from a pending review-queue row. Use for the email→person review queue (candidate_id null, one side has no person). Pass with profile_b.
`profile_b`	No	Source-prefixed profile id (e.g. github:123) — the profile_b from list_identity_matches. Pass with profile_a.
`candidate_id`	No	merge_candidates id of a pending match (the candidate_id from list_identity_matches).
`confirmation_token`	No	Returned BY a needs-confirmation response. Pass it back to merge anyway, only after the user reviewed the evidence. Cannot be guessed/pre-set.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`ok`	Yes	Whether noticed completed the operation.
`data`	No	The operation result when ok is true.
`error`	No	A human-readable error when ok is false.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedAug 22, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": true,
+  "properties": {
+    "data": {
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "description": "The operation result when ok is true.",
+      "properties": {},
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "error": {
+      "description": "A human-readable error when ok is false.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "ok": {
+      "description": "Whether noticed completed the operation.",
+      "type": "boolean"
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "ok"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedAug 22, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false. The description adds significant behavioral context: it clarifies the target/first record survives and the user's own person always survives, notes reversibility (admin can undo), and explains the needs-confirmation response with a token, including the instruction not to pre-set the token. These details go well beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but information-dense, with the core purpose and identification options up front, followed by behavioral caveats. Every sentence contributes meaningful guidance, but the density makes it slightly harder to parse quickly. It is well-structured overall.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex merge operation with a destructive hint, the description covers all essential aspects: identification methods, survival rules, reversibility, the confirmation flow with token, and the admin-only restriction for verified sign-ins. The output schema exists, so return values need not be explained. Nothing critical is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema covers 100% of parameters, but the description adds valuable usage semantics: which combination of parameters to use (candidate_id vs person_a+b vs profile_a+b), that profile_a+b is for the email→person queue where candidate_id is null, and the confirmation_token usage. This enhances the schema descriptions rather than simply repeating them.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states the verb 'Accept' and the resource 'a PENDING identity match' with the outcome 'merge the two records into one'. It clearly differentiates from sibling tools like dismiss_identity_match (reject) and mark_different_people (mark as different) by specifying the merge action.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explains when to use it (for a pending match), how to identify the match (candidate_id, person_a+b, or profile_a+b with a note on which queue), and the confirmation flow when conflicting evidence exists. It also mentions admin-only for verified-sign-in conflicts. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives like dismiss_identity_match, but the context is clear enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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