Read installation credits, current authorized source hosts, scope expiration and rewards. Bearer accessKey. Does not enable sharing or publish.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | ||
| scope | Yes | ||
| status | Yes | ||
| rewards | Yes | ||
| expiresAt | Yes | ||
| policyVersion | Yes | ||
| remainingReads | Yes | ||
| feedbackEnabled | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+ "properties": {
+ "expiresAt": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "feedbackEnabled": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "id": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "policyVersion": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "remainingReads": {
+ "type": "integer"
+ },
+ "rewards": {
+ "items": {
+ "properties": {
+ "reads": {
+ "type": "integer"
+ },
+ "reason": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "type": "object"
+ },
+ "type": "array"
+ },
+ "scope": {
+ "properties": {
+ "active": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "expiresAt": {
+ "type": [
+ "string",
+ "null"
+ ]
+ },
+ "hosts": {
+ "items": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "type": "array"
+ },
+ "id": {
+ "type": [
+ "string",
+ "null"
+ ]
+ },
+ "sources": {
+ "items": {
+ "properties": {
+ "host": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "pathPrefixes": {
+ "items": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "type": "array"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "host",
+ "pathPrefixes"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+ },
+ "type": "array"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "id",
+ "hosts",
+ "sources",
+ "expiresAt",
+ "active"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+ },
+ "status": {
+ "const": "approved",
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "id",
+ "status",
+ "remainingReads",
+ "expiresAt",
+ "scope",
+ "feedbackEnabled",
+ "rewards",
+ "policyVersion"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint=false and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description still adds real value by disclosing the 'Bearer accessKey' authentication requirement, which annotations do not convey, and reinforces the non-mutating boundary.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with the returned data followed by auth and boundary notes; nothing is padded. The 'Bearer accessKey' fragment is terse but functional rather than wasteful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return-value explanation is not required, and auth plus scope are covered. The remaining gap is sibling disambiguation: for a status-read tool sitting next to 'contribution_access_status', the description should say how the two differ, and it does not.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline is 4; there are no parameter semantics for the description to clarify and it does not need to compensate for any schema gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific verb ('Read') and enumerates the concrete resources returned: installation credits, authorized source hosts, scope expiration and rewards. However, it offers no differentiation from the near-identically named sibling 'contribution_access_status', which an agent could easily confuse it with.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The closing clause 'Does not enable sharing or publish' gives an implicit boundary on what the tool is for, and the read framing implies status inspection. But there is no explicit when-to-use statement and, critically, no routing guidance against the very similar sibling tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.