Otto Intel

Read one end user's delegation status (token-bound)

otto_delegation_status

Read-onlyIdempotent

Read back, for the end user identified by a CDP access token, their CDP accounts, whether the Model-B fence is present, and whether an active delegation reads back (with its expiry and the per-swap cap recorded for it). Arguments: { accessToken } — the server resolves the user from the token; a client-sent user id is refused. delegation.per_swap_cap_usd is the number THIS user chose at mint time; it is ABSENT when no cap is recorded for the grant, which means the delegated send will refuse it — say so rather than showing the shared ceiling. fence.per_swap_cap_usd is that shared ceiling and is never a per-user number. Output is bound to that user; nothing about any other user is returned. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the x-otto-delegation-auth request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`fence`	Yes
`user_id`	Yes
`addresses`	Yes
`delegation`	Yes
`mint_enabled`	Yes
`ruleset_version`	Yes
`revocation_requested_here`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed4 schema fields changedSep 3, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / delegation / properties / per_swap_cap_usd

Added value: +{
+  "maximum": 5000,
+  "minimum": 1,
+  "type": "integer"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / mint_enabled
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "boolean"
+}
```

addedOutput schema / properties / ruleset_version

Added value: +{
+  "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+  "minimum": 1,
+  "type": "integer"
+}

changedOutput schema / required

Previous value: -[
-  "user_id",
-  "addresses",
-  "fence",
-  "delegation",
-  "revocation_requested_here"
-]New value: +[
+  "user_id",
+  "addresses",
+  "fence",
+  "delegation",
+  "revocation_requested_here",
+  "ruleset_version",
+  "mint_enabled"
+]

AddedSep 1, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark the tool as read-only and idempotent, but the description goes well beyond that: it explains authentication requirements, token-based user resolution, refusal of client-sent user ids, output scoping to the authenticated user, and the subtle difference between `delegation.per_swap_cap_usd` and `fence.per_swap_cap_usd`. This is rich behavioral disclosure that meaningfully informs an agent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: core read behavior, token semantics, cap-value disambiguation, output scoping, and auth requirements are each covered without redundancy. It is front-loaded with the primary purpose before layering in necessary caveats.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given that an output schema exists and annotations cover safety, the description supplies all remaining context an agent needs: authentication, user resolution, per-cap semantics, and output isolation. Nothing critical is missing for correct invocation and interpretation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema lists zero properties, but the description explains that the effective input is an `accessToken` resolved server-side, that a user id will be refused, and that the listed permissive schema is intentionally loose with strict validation occurring post-auth. For a zero-parameter tool, this is strong semantic guidance beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Read back'), a specific resource (one end user's delegation status), and enumerates exactly what is returned: CDP accounts, Model-B fence presence, active delegation with expiry and per-swap cap. The title and description together clearly distinguish this read-oriented delegation tool from the other delegation sibling tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit invocation context: server-to-server only, required `x-otto-delegation-auth` header, and refusal without it. It also states that a client-sent user id is refused and that the server resolves the user from the token. It does not explicitly name sibling tools as alternatives, so there is no direct 'use this instead of X' guidance, but the context is clear enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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