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Revoke one end user's delegation, developer-side, confirmed by read-back

otto_delegation_revoke
DestructiveIdempotent

Revoke the end user's delegation from Otto's side and confirm by read-back that it no longer exists; from then on this server submits nothing for that user (fail-closed, even if the read-back had failed). Arguments: EITHER { accessToken } (the user path — the server resolves the user from the token) OR { userId, support_reason } (the support path, for an operator holding the server secret; the reason is logged, the token never is). Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the x-otto-delegation-auth request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYes
revokedYes
user_idYes
reads_backYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds substantial behavioral context beyond the annotations: it states the fail-closed behavior even if read-back fails, notes that the server will submit nothing for that user afterward, and explains that unauthenticated calls are refused before any read. This goes well beyond the destructive and idempotent hints already present.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Every sentence earns its place: the core operation, fail-closed consequence, argument alternatives, authentication requirement, and schema note are all necessary and front-loaded. The description is dense but not bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, server-to-server revocation tool, the description covers invocation paths, authentication, side effects, fail-closed behavior, and the intentionally permissive schema. With an output schema present, return-value documentation is not needed, and nothing essential to calling the tool correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Although the input schema is empty and permissive, the description fully compensates by defining the two mutually exclusive argument sets: accessToken, or userId plus support_reason. It also clarifies authentication is via header, not arguments, and that strict validation occurs after authentication.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Revoke the end user's delegation from Otto's side' and 'confirm by read-back.' It clearly identifies the action and its effect, distinguishing this revocation operation from read-only or status tools like otto_delegation_status.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit usage paths and context: the user path with accessToken versus the support path with userId and support_reason, plus server-to-server-only authentication via the x-otto-delegation-auth header. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or state when not to use this tool, so it stops short of full alternative routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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