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Read the Model-B delegation fence (public promise: present, name, rules digest, per-swap cap)

otto_delegation_fence_status
Read-onlyIdempotent

PUBLIC and read-only, no header: whether the Model-B project policy that fences every delegated send is installed and v-current on this server, with its versioned name, rules digest, the per-swap cap ceiling in USD (shared by every delegated user — a person may choose any whole-dollar cap from per_swap_cap_min_usd up to it, enforced server-side and recorded against their own grant), and Otto's PUBLIC CDP project id (a UUID — the authority an agent binds its mint to). Exposes ONLY the fence's public promise — never an end user, a grant, an address or a policy's contents. An agent about to mint a delegation (otto-execute delegate) reads this first, mints to the published project_id and no other, and refuses to mint when the fence is not present; the server enforces fence-before-authority on every delegated send regardless. Arguments: {}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reasonNo
presentYes
project_idNo
policy_nameYes
mint_enabledYes
rules_digestNo
ruleset_versionYes
per_swap_cap_usdYes
per_swap_cap_min_usdYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / mint_enabled
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / per_swap_cap_min_usd
      Added value: +{
      +  "const": 1,
      +  "type": "number"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / ruleset_version
      Added value: +{
      +  "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +  "minimum": 1,
      +  "type": "integer"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "present",
      -  "policy_name",
      -  "per_swap_cap_usd"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "present",
      +  "policy_name",
      +  "per_swap_cap_usd",
      +  "per_swap_cap_min_usd",
      +  "ruleset_version",
      +  "mint_enabled"
      +]
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and idempotentHint=true. The description adds significant context beyond those: it is PUBLIC, requires no header, exposes only the fence's public promise and never end users/grants/addresses, defines the shared cap semantics, and states an enforcement guarantee ('the server enforces fence-before-authority on every delegated send regardless'). No contradiction with annotations exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single dense paragraph that front-loads the core purpose before providing operational details. Each clause adds value: public scope, cap ceiling semantics, project id authority, usage before minting, and server-side enforcement. It is slightly long, but the density is justified by the need to convey the fence's contract accurately.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The combination of a clear purpose, explicit usage context, privacy/scope limitations, enforcement behavior, and the presence of an output schema makes the definition complete for an agent. The description explains all returned conceptual fields, the required action before minting, and the safety net, so nothing necessary for correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has zero properties and the description explicitly states 'Arguments: {}.' With no parameters, there is no semantic burden on the description, and the 0-param baseline of 4 applies. The description appropriately does not invent parameter details.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a clear statement: it tells whether the Model-B delegation fence is installed and current on the server, and it names the exact returned data: versioned name, rules digest, per-swap cap ceiling, and Otto's public CDP project id. It also explicitly scopes what it exposes ('Exposes ONLY the fence's public promise'), making it clearly distinguishable from sibling tools like otto_delegation_fence and otto_delegation_status.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'An agent about to mint a delegation (otto-execute delegate) reads this first, mints to the published project_id and no other, and refuses to mint when the fence is not present.' It also notes the server enforces the policy regardless, providing useful safety context. It does not name sibling alternatives or state when not to use the tool, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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