Otto Intel

Read the Model-B delegation fence (public promise: present, name, rules digest, per-swap cap)

otto_delegation_fence_status

Read-onlyIdempotent

PUBLIC and read-only, no header: reports whether the Model B project policy still fences existing delegated sends, its name and rules digest, the shared cap ceiling, and mint_enabled for new Model B trade setup. New trade-permission creation is retired, so mint_enabled is false on the serving retirement build. Existing status, revoke and exits remain available. No user, grant, address or policy contents are exposed. Arguments: {}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`reason`	No
`present`	Yes
`project_id`	No
`policy_name`	Yes
`mint_enabled`	Yes
`rules_digest`	No
`ruleset_version`	Yes
`per_swap_cap_usd`	Yes
`per_swap_cap_min_usd`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed4 schema fields changedSep 3, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / mint_enabled
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "boolean"
+}
```

addedOutput schema / properties / per_swap_cap_min_usd

Added value: +{
+  "const": 1,
+  "type": "number"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / ruleset_version

Added value: +{
+  "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+  "minimum": 1,
+  "type": "integer"
+}

changedOutput schema / required

Previous value: -[
-  "present",
-  "policy_name",
-  "per_swap_cap_usd"
-]New value: +[
+  "present",
+  "policy_name",
+  "per_swap_cap_usd",
+  "per_swap_cap_min_usd",
+  "ruleset_version",
+  "mint_enabled"
+]

AddedSep 1, 2026

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Even with readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint already present, the description adds real behavioral value: no authentication header is required, mint_enabled is false on the serving retirement build because new trade-permission creation is retired, and no user/grant/address/policy contents are exposed. These details go beyond the annotations and are directly useful to an agent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first sentence front-loads the core purpose and outputs, while the remaining sentences add only relevant context: retirement of new trade-permission creation, availability of related operations, and the privacy boundary. The description is appropriately sized for a zero-parameter tool and avoids filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter read-only tool with an output schema, the description supplies everything an agent needs: authentication posture, privacy scope, the meaning of mint_enabled, and the tool's place in the delegation workflow. Because an output schema exists, the description does not need to explain return values.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool has zero parameters and the schema coverage is 100%, so the schema is already exhaustive. The description's 'Arguments: {}' is redundant but harmless, and no parameter-level semantics are needed beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb, 'reports', and names a precise resource: whether the Model B project policy still fences existing delegated sends, along with the fence name, rules digest, shared cap ceiling, and mint_enabled. It is clearly scoped away from delegation mutation tools by saying 'No user, grant, address or policy contents are exposed.' The title and description align well.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly establishes when this tool is appropriate: it is PUBLIC, read-only, requires no header, and reports fence status rather than performing revokes or exits. It also states 'Existing status, revoke and exits remain available,' which points toward complementary operations. It does not explicitly name sibling tools as alternatives, but the usage context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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