Skip to main content
Glama

Ensure the Model-B project policy (the delegation fence) is installed and reads back as v-current

otto_delegation_fence
Idempotent

Idempotent ensure-by-digest of the ONE CDP project-scope policy that fences every delegated send, then a read-back. Writes only when no project policy exists (creates it) or when the existing one is Otto's own lineage with stale rules (updates it in place). REFUSES BY NAME if a different project-scope policy is installed — it is never overwritten or deleted. Never downgrades a newer fence. An OPS action: at most one ensure runs project-wide at a time, never during a rolling deploy, never from the dApp (the mint gate reads fence.present from otto_delegation_status). Arguments: {}. Output: the policy id, versioned name, rules digest and the per-swap cap; the tool fails unless the fence reads back present under the written id. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the x-otto-delegation-auth request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionYes
statusYes
policy_idYes
policy_nameYes
rules_digestYes
per_swap_cap_usdYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already state idempotentHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and destructiveHint=false, and the description is fully consistent with those. It adds substantial behavioral detail: it creates only when missing, updates in place only Otto's own lineage with stale rules, refuses by name any other installed policy, never downgrades a newer fence, and fails unless the read-back returns present under the written id.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Although the description is long, each sentence adds distinct operational value: idempotency conditions, refusal behavior, downgrade protection, OPS restrictions, auth requirement, and output contract. It front-loads the core ensure-by-digest purpose before diving into constraints.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description is complete for an operation with no parameters: it specifies the auth header, when writes happen, when the tool refuses, the output fields, and the failure condition. Because an output schema exists, the return-value description is a bonus rather than a necessity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There are zero parameters, so there is nothing to explain in the input schema itself; the description explicitly confirms 'Arguments: {}'. It also explains why the listed schema is permissive: the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated, which prevents an agent from assuming the empty schema means no validation at all.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Idempotent ensure-by-digest of the ONE CDP project-scope policy that fences every delegated send, then a read-back.' This clearly distinguishes the ensure/mutate action from read-style siblings like otto_delegation_fence_status. The title reinforces the same purpose: installed and reads back as v-current.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives strong usage context: it is an OPS action, never runs during a rolling deploy, never runs from the dApp, and runs at most one at a time project-wide. It does not explicitly say 'use otto_delegation_fence_status for inspection,' but it does distinguish the write path from the read path by mentioning the mint gate reads fence.present from otto_delegation_status.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources