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Site Doctor — WordPress diagnosis

saas_query

Read-only SQL against Site Doctor's OWN database: why a job failed, whether a report was opened, seats per organization, run history. This is the platform's data — use "probe" with db_query for a monitored site's WordPress database instead. CAUTION about sd_logevents: it holds only the SIGNAL (errors + sensitive writes) — successful traffic is filtered out on ingest, so it is useless for "how much traffic / which pages" questions; the full access log lives on each site and is read with probe op "ah_events". Superadmin only. Name the columns you want: SELECT * is refused, because it would return columns you did not ask for. Session and API tokens live in this database, so credential tables and columns cannot be named at all.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sqlYesOne SELECT/WITH/SHOW/DESCRIBE statement, no semicolon.
max_rowsNodefault 200, max 1000

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well on constraints: read-only, superadmin-only, SELECT * refused, credential tables/columns blocked. However, it omits result behavior an agent needs, such as the shape of returned rows, column naming, or how errors/denials surface, which matters for a free-form SQL tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and scope are front-loaded, followed by the alternative tool, the data caveat, and the hard constraints. It is dense and somewhat long, but nearly every clause carries operational information; only the sd_logevents caution borders on over-explanation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, no-output-schema query tool with no annotations, the definition supplies scope, prerequisites, sibling routing, and hard query restrictions — enough to call it correctly. The remaining gap is return-value behavior (row format, truncation signaling against max_rows), which no structured field covers.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both `sql` (single statement, no semicolon) and `max_rows` (default 200, max 1000) are already documented. The description adds a meaningful constraint on `sql` ('name the columns you want: SELECT * is refused'), but says nothing extra about max_rows or statement-type edge cases beyond what the schema supplies, so baseline 3 fits.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Read-only SQL against Site Doctor's OWN database') and enumerates the question types it answers (job failures, report opens, seat counts, run history). It explicitly contrasts with the sibling `probe`/`db_query` path for monitored WordPress databases, so an agent can route without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-not guidance ('use probe with db_query for a monitored site's WordPress database instead') and a concrete trap to avoid: sd_logevents holds only errors and sensitive writes, not traffic, which is read via probe op 'ah_events'. It also states the superadmin prerequisite and the SELECT * prohibition up front.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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