Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false; the description goes further and discloses the two facts those hints don't convey: the new secret is displayed only once, and the old secret stops working immediately. That is exactly the irreversibility detail an agent needs before invoking a destructive write.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence, front-loaded with the action, followed by two parenthetical-style consequences. No wasted words and nothing buried.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does cover the return-value nuance (secret shown once). For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation it could still mention auth/permission requirements or confirm that the endpoint itself is unaffected, but the essentials are present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter, and schema coverage is 100% — the schema already documents endpoint_id with a UUID format and a pointer to list_webhooks. The description adds nothing beyond the schema, which is the baseline-3 case.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb+resource ('Issues a new signing secret for an endpoint'), which maps cleanly to the rotate_webhook_secret name. It does not explicitly contrast itself with update_webhook or create_webhook, so the sibling differentiation is only implicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Rotation usage is implied by 'a new signing secret', but there is no explicit when-to-use, no exclusion (e.g., 'not for changing the endpoint URL — use update_webhook'), and no prerequisite statement. An agent can infer intent but must guess at alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.