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sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI

Arm an enforcement loop

sebbi_enforce_create

Automated Enforcement Loop: when the customer's sealed decisions cross a threshold, sebbi.pro acts at once. It contains the AI (every further decision on the key is a sealed BLOCK, so the sebbi.pro Gateway stops calling the model), pulls their Jugular switches, fires a signed webhook into their own infrastructure, and emails them. Every trip and release is sealed. trigger: {count, window_seconds, verdicts ([BLOCK, CHALLENGE, ALLOW]), reasons_any (words to find in the decision's reasons, e.g. prompt_injection or a risk signal name), min_score, field {field, op (eq, ne, gt, gte, lt, lte, in, not_in, contains, exists), value}, distinct_field (count different values of this field, e.g. model)}. actions: {contain_minutes (-1 = until released, 0 = no), jugular_ids, webhook_url (https), email_owner}. mode: armed or watch. Run sebbi_enforce_backtest first.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "api_key": "<api_key>",
      "trigger": "<trigger>"
    },
    "name": "sebbi_enforce_create"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modeNo
nameNo
actionsNo
api_keyYes
triggerYes
cooldown_secondsNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate this is not read-only and is open-world, and the description adds substantial behavioral detail: future decisions become sealed BLOCKs, switches are pulled, a signed webhook is sent, email is triggered, and trips/releases are sealed. It also explains containment semantics such as '-1 = until released, 0 = no', though it does not cover permissions or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but front-loads the operational effect before detailing trigger and action shapes. The inline pseudo-schema is efficient for a complex nested-object tool, though the prose is somewhat jargon-heavy and could be easier to scan.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex mutation tool with no output schema and nested trigger/action objects, the description gives enough behavioral and parameter context to call it safely in principle. It still omits response behavior, auth expectations, and the roles of name and cooldown_seconds, so it is not fully complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 0% schema description coverage, the description does most of the explanatory work: it documents trigger subfields such as count, window_seconds, verdicts, reasons_any, min_score, field, and distinct_field, plus action fields like contain_minutes, jugular_ids, webhook_url, and email_owner. It leaves api_key, name, and cooldown_seconds unexplained, so it is strong but not complete.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly frames an automated enforcement loop and enumerates its effects: containing the AI, pulling Jugular switches, firing a webhook, and emailing. It distinguishes itself from related tools by pointing to sebbi_enforce_backtest as a prerequisite, though the literal 'create/arm' action is carried mostly by the title rather than the description itself.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The prerequisite 'Run sebbi_enforce_backtest first' gives useful usage context, and mode values 'armed' or 'watch' are listed. However, the difference between those modes is not explained, and there is no explicit when-not-to-use guidance or comparison to alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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