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sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI

Check a payment before money moves

sebbi_banking_pay_check

Call before releasing ANY payment, whether an AI agent or a payment system is sending it. One call checks the agent's authority (Mandate Chain, Agent Passport or Spend Gate token), the payee's sealed bank details (Payment Notary), the human kill switch (Jugular) and every FCA-named fraud indicator, then answers RELEASE, HOLD or STOP with the reasons, sealed. Release money only on RELEASE. The answer lists the next tools to call. Needs api_key; never send names or account numbers.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
payeeNowho is being paid (your reference)
amountYes
api_keyYes
mandateNoMandate Chain token when an AI agent started the payment
audienceNothe site an Agent Passport is presented at
passportNoAgent Passport token when an AI agent started the payment
directionNo
payee_newNo
payee_refNo
payer_refNowho is paying (your reference); defaults to agent-payments
cop_resultNo
jugular_idNothe Jugular kill switch held over this fraud engine
lineage_idNoModel Lineage code of the scoring model setup
new_deviceNo
vulnerableNo
spend_tokenNoSpend Gate token when an AI agent started the payment
customer_refNo
remote_accessNo
account_openedNo
customer_on_callNo
payee_fingerprintNosha256 hex of payment:v1|<business name, trimmed, lower case>|<sort code digits>|<account digits>, checked against the Payment Notary
crypto_or_investmentNo
expected_max_paymentNo
expected_monthly_turnoverNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Despite sparse annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false), the description discloses the verdict model (RELEASE/HOLD/STOP), that reasons come back sealed, that the response enumerates follow-up tools, and a data-handling caveat ('never send names or account numbers'). It does not explain why it is a non-read-only operation (presumably an audit record) or whether a HOLD is reversible.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the imperative trigger, then the checks, then the verdict rule, then the API key and PII caveat. Dense but nearly every clause carries decision-relevant content; only the long enumeration of subsystems runs slightly long.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 24-parameter, no-output-schema tool, the description covers the essential contract: when to call, what is checked, what verdict comes back, what to do with it, and the authentication requirement. The gap is guidance on optional/deep-fraud parameters, but the core call path is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 38% across 24 parameters, so the description could do more. It groups the meaning of key inputs (Mandate Chain / Agent Passport / Spend Gate tokens, Payment Notary fingerprint, Jugular kill switch, fraud indicators), but leaves many properties such as direction, cop_result, new_device, expected_max_payment and account_opened undocumented in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb and resource: 'checks the agent's authority... the payee's sealed bank details... the human kill switch... and every FCA-named fraud indicator' and returns RELEASE/HOLD/STOP. It is unambiguously the pre-payment gate, distinguishable from siblings like sebbi_banking_verify or sebbi_spend_verify.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit timing: 'Call before releasing ANY payment, whether an AI agent or a payment system is sending it' plus the hard rule 'Release money only on RELEASE.' It tells the agent to follow the returned next-tool list, but never names a sibling tool it replaces or a case where it should not be called.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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