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Particle Alert Delete

particle_alert_delete
Destructive

Delete an alert. This is a soft delete: the alert stops producing matches and disappears from particle_alert_list, but its past matches and deliveries are retained for audit. To pause an alert instead of removing it, use particle_alert_update with is_active=false.

Only the alert's creator or an organization OWNER or ADMIN can delete it; an API key acts as the user who created the key. Other callers get a 403.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
alert_idYesAlert id to delete.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, but the description adds genuinely new behavior: this is a soft delete, matches and deliveries are retained for audit, the alert disappears from particle_alert_list, and unauthorized callers get a 403. The note that an API key acts as the user who created the key is context the annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the core action and the soft-delete consequence, followed by the alternative and the permission rule. Every sentence carries information an agent needs; there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive tool with no output schema, the definition covers what is destroyed versus retained, where the alert disappears from, the escape hatch for pausing, and the authorization model including the 403 outcome. Nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already carries the parameter documentation and the description need not repeat it. The description implies the alert must be one the caller owns or administers, but adds no format or identifier guidance for alert_id itself, matching the baseline of 3 when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb+resource ('Delete an alert') and immediately qualifies the scope with the soft-delete semantics, so an agent knows exactly what operation is performed. It also names the sibling tool it is not (particle_alert_update), which is the main source of ambiguity among the alert tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit when-not and the alternative: 'To pause an alert instead of removing it, use particle_alert_update with is_active=false.' It also states the caller conditions under which the tool is valid, so an agent can decide before invoking.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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