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Counterparty Check · write

counterparty_check
Destructive

Create, change or pay at http://demo-counterparty-api:8000 through Regent (POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE). Every call is a gated decision under the agent's spend limit; a payment the owner has not pre-approved is parked for them (ESCALATION_REQUIRED) and executes on a retry with the same idempotency_key after approval. The credential never reaches the agent.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNoJSON body (optional)
pathYesPath after the base URL
factsNoVerified facts the policy keys on (object).
intentNoOne-line reason for this call, recorded in the audit.
methodNoPOST
user_tokenNoThe human's OIDC id_token when acting for a person.
idempotency_keyNoYour own key for this call. If the call is parked for a human (ESCALATION_REQUIRED), repeat it with the same key after approval to execute it.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations (readOnly/destructive/openWorld/idempotent) by disclosing the gating model: every call is a spend-limited decision, unapproved payments are parked with ESCALATION_REQUIRED, and they execute only on retry with the same idempotency_key. It also states the credential never reaches the agent, covering the auth surface that annotations omit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three dense sentences, front-loaded with the verb/resource and target URL, then the behavioral contract. Every sentence carries information, though the middle sentence packs gating, escalation, and idempotency into one clause chain.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description carries return-shape burden, and it does name the key terminal state (ESCALATION_REQUIRED) and the credential-handling behavior. It does not describe the general success/failure response shape or other error conditions, leaving a modest gap for a 7-parameter write tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents parameters like idempotency_key, intent, and user_token. The description restates the idempotency_key retry semantics rather than adding new meaning, and says nothing about path, body, facts, or method beyond the method list already in the schema. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States specific write verbs (create, change, pay) and the resource (the counterparty API reached through Regent) with the exact HTTP methods it proxies. It reads clearly as the write counterpart to counterparty_check_read, but it never names that sibling or explicitly draws the read/write boundary, so differentiation is inferred rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied: write operations go through this tool and are gated under the agent's spend limit, with payments escalating to the owner. There is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance, no mention of when to prefer counterparty_check_read, pay, or budget_request_status, and no prerequisites stated for the caller.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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