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openentity_present

Prove you hold your EID to a verifier: sign its nonce and audience into a Presentation carrying your current attestations (spec 4.7).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
eidYes
nonceYesThe verifier's nonce
audienceYesThe verifier's origin URL or DID, exactly as it gave it
private_key_jwkYesYour key, used for this call only

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose the key trait that this is a signing operation consuming a private key and producing a Presentation bound to the nonce/audience. It says nothing about side effects (whether anything is stored or recorded locally), nonce single-use semantics, failure modes for a mismatched audience, or how the resulting Presentation is delivered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with a colon that elaborates the mechanism — no filler. It is dense with domain jargon ("Presentation", "attestations", "spec 4.7") that is not glossed, which slightly limits first-read comprehension.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a four-required-parameter cryptographic tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers the core contract: what gets signed, why, and what artifact results. Missing are return shape and whether the presentation is returned to the caller or transmitted, which matters since no output schema exists.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75% (nonce, audience, private_key_jwk are documented; eid is not), so the schema does most of the work. The description adds real value by explaining that nonce and audience are cryptographically bound into the signature, but adds nothing about eid or how the private key is scoped beyond the schema's own note.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific action (sign a verifier's nonce and audience into a Presentation) and the resource (your EID / its attestations), which is much more than the name alone conveys. It implicitly separates the proving side from openentity_verify, but never names that sibling, so an agent must infer the division of labour.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Prove you hold your EID to a verifier" implies the triggering situation (a verifier issued a nonce and expects a presentation), but there is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or named alternative such as openentity_verify vs openentity_present. Usage is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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