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OMENZ agent tools

passport_issue

Permission Passport: issue a signed (Ed25519), expiring, job-scoped permission ticket for an agent: which tools, which hosts (plus explicit denies), how much it may spend, for how long (max 7 days). Carries permissions, never credentials. Any tool can check it with /passport/check or verify it offline with the public key. Limits damage when an agent is hijacked. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/passport/issue, $0.002 via x402.)

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "scope": "<scope>"
    },
    "name": "passport_issue"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full load and does well: it discloses the signing algorithm, expiry bound (max 7 days), that it carries permissions and never credentials, offline verifiability, and the production endpoint with $0.002 x402 pricing. It omits failure behavior, revocation, and whether issuance itself requires authentication, which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense and front-loaded: the core definition comes first, followed by verification path, threat rationale, then deployment/pricing notes. Most sentences earn their place, though 'By OMENZ' is pure branding and the AYNE playzone parenthetical is marginal for an agent deciding how to call the tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter issuance tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers purpose, scope semantics, crypto properties, expiry limits, verification path, and environment/pricing. The notable gap is the return value — what the issued ticket looks like and what the caller receives — plus failure modes.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% and the single parameter is a nested object, so the description must compensate — and it largely does, enumerating the semantic contents of 'scope': which tools, which hosts plus explicit denies, spend ceiling, and duration with a 7-day cap. It stops short of naming the actual nested field keys, so an agent still has to guess the shape.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'issue a signed (Ed25519), expiring, job-scoped permission ticket for an agent'. It also names the conceptual contents of the ticket (tools, hosts, spend, duration), which separates it from the read-side sibling passport_check, which is explicitly referenced via '/passport/check'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies a workflow (issue a ticket, then any tool checks it with /passport/check or verifies offline with the public key) and gives a rationale ('limits damage when an agent is hijacked'). But it never states when to call this versus alternatives, nor any precondition such as needing an identity or prior authorization before issuance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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