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Act through a fully authorized provider

vault_provider_write
Destructive

Change provider state through a full-provider or owner-equivalent grant on a registered provider API surface. API Vault pins or validates the destination origin, binds GitHub/Supabase requests to resources authorized by this user, injects that user's OAuth credential server-side, classifies risk, and enforces the owner's financial/security/destructive/communication switches. For google.api.generic, supply the exact HTTPS Google API origin under *.googleapis.com.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "account_id": "<account_id>",
      "surface_id": "<surface_id>",
      "method": "<method>",
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "vault_provider_write"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNo
pathYesProvider-relative path only; absolute and scheme-relative URLs are rejected.
methodYes
originNoRequired only for dynamic surfaces such as google.api.generic. Use an origin only (for example https://run.googleapis.com), never a path, query, credentials, or fragment.
headersNo
risk_hintNoOptional descriptive hint; it cannot lower server-classified risk.
account_idYes
surface_idYes
intent_lease_idNoOptional active task-scoped Intent Lease. When supplied, it further narrows this provider action and consumes one lease action.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the supplied annotations it discloses substantive behavior: origin pinning/validation, binding GitHub/Supabase requests to resources this user is authorized for, server-side OAuth credential injection, server risk classification, and enforcement of the owner's financial/security/destructive/communication switches. It also warns that risk_hint cannot lower server-classified risk and that an intent lease is consumed per action — exactly the side-effect context an agent needs for a destructive call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the core action and followed by the policy envelope; nothing is redundant with the annotations. The second sentence is a long comma-chained clause list that is denser than it needs to be, but every clause carries real information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, open-world, non-idempotent write with 9 parameters and no output schema, the safety and policy envelope is well covered, but nothing tells the agent how to obtain account_id/surface_id or what the response looks like on success versus a policy-blocked failure. Adequate for invocation, incomplete for end-to-end use.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 44% across 9 parameters, so the description must compensate, and it largely does not: body, headers, account_id, surface_id, and method get no semantic treatment. The one parameter it does explain, origin, is already documented identically in the schema, so the marginal meaning added is minimal.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Change provider state ... on a registered provider API surface" states a concrete verb and resource, and the mutation framing separates it from vault_provider_read and vault_invoke_read. It is still an abstract HTTP-forwarding description, but the reader knows this is an authorized write against a provider surface, not a generic invoke.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The only routing guidance is conditional ("For google.api.generic, supply the exact HTTPS Google API origin under *.googleapis.com") plus the precondition of a full-provider or owner-equivalent grant. It never states when to prefer this over vault_invoke_write or vault_execute, so the agent must infer the split between similarly named write tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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