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Read through a fully authorized provider

vault_provider_read
Read-onlyIdempotent

Read data through a full-provider or owner-equivalent grant on a registered provider API surface using a GET request. API Vault pins or validates the destination origin, binds GitHub/Supabase requests to resources authorized by this user, and injects that user's OAuth credential server-side. For google.api.generic, supply the exact HTTPS Google API origin under *.googleapis.com. Use vault_provider_write for any operation that changes provider state.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "account_id": "<account_id>",
      "surface_id": "<surface_id>",
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "vault_provider_read"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYesProvider-relative path only; absolute and scheme-relative URLs are rejected.
originNoRequired only for dynamic surfaces such as google.api.generic. Use an origin only (for example https://run.googleapis.com), never a path, query, credentials, or fragment.
headersNo
account_idYes
surface_idYes
intent_lease_idNoOptional active task-scoped Intent Lease. When supplied, it further narrows this provider action and consumes one lease action.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive and open-world, yet the description adds behavior the agent could not infer: origin pinning/validation, GitHub/Supabase resource binding to the authorized user, and server-side OAuth credential injection. The note that a supplied Intent Lease consumes one lease action is a real side effect disclosed up front.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then the authorization/credential model, then the dynamic-origin rule and the sibling exclusion. Three dense sentences with no filler, though the jargon ('owner-equivalent grant', 'registered provider API surface') costs some readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only, non-destructive tool with full annotation coverage and no output schema, the description covers the security model, origin requirement and lease side effect well. The remaining gap is operational: nothing tells the agent where account_id and surface_id come from (e.g., vault_connections) or what error surface to expect when origin validation rejects a request.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50%, so the schema documents path (provider-relative only) and origin (dynamic surfaces only) while account_id, surface_id, headers and intent_lease_id are undocumented. The description reinforces origin usage for google.api.generic but adds only narrow detail beyond the schema text and says nothing about the two required identifiers, which are the least self-explanatory parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence gives a specific verb (read), the exact resource (registered provider API surface) and the access model (full-provider or owner-equivalent grant via GET). It also names the write counterpart vault_provider_write, which lets an agent separate read from write paths without opening another schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states an explicit boundary — use vault_provider_write for anything that changes provider state — and adds a condition for the google.api.generic case (supply the exact HTTPS Google API origin under *.googleapis.com). It does not contrast with vault_invoke_read or explain prerequisites for obtaining a provider-scoped grant, so routing guidance is clear but not exhaustive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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