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Invoke an authorized API-key connection

vault_invoke_write
Destructive

Execute a provider operation through an authorized API-key/PAT connection using a POST request, including AI model calls. Authentication and destination hosts are controlled by API Vault; the stored credential is injected server-side and never returned.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "connection_id": "<connection_id>",
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "vault_invoke_write"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNo
pathYes
headersNo
model_idNo
operationNoapi.request
credentialNoFor owner-bound custom APIs only. API Vault chooses Bearer by default; set this only when the provider docs require a custom header or query parameter. The stored key is still injected server-side and never returned.
connection_idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructive=true, openWorld=true, and idempotent=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real information beyond them: authentication and destination hosts are governed by API Vault, and the stored credential is injected server-side and never returned. It still does not say what a destructive call can affect or what failure/rate-limit behavior looks like.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tightly written sentences with the operation and transport front-loaded and the security model second. No filler, no repetition of the title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a destructive, open-world tool with 7 parameters, nested objects, no output schema, and near-zero schema description coverage. The description covers the security model but leaves how to construct `path`, `body`, `headers`, and `operation` entirely unaddressed, which is a substantial gap for an agent invoking it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 14% across 7 parameters; only `credential` is documented in the schema. The description clarifies the credential-injection model and that hosts/auth come from the connection, but says nothing about `path`, `body`, `headers`, `model_id`, or the `operation` default of 'api.request'. With this little schema coverage, the description should carry far more parameter meaning than it does.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb (Execute) and resource (provider operation over an authorized API-key/PAT connection) and pins the transport ('POST request'), which implicitly separates it from the read sibling. It stops short of naming vault_invoke_read or vault_provider_write as the alternative, so differentiation is inferred rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the POST-only phrasing and the note that AI model calls are included, which tells an agent this is the write/invoke path. There is no explicit statement of when to prefer vault_invoke_read, vault_provider_write, or vault_execute, and no prerequisites or exclusions are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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