(Admin) List all usermanagement permissions (resource/action pairs used for page-access and role-permission mapping). These are the addable 'permission' options; KG action-capabilities are listed by brainkb_list_capabilities.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description notes '(Admin)' as an access constraint and clarifies the scope (usermanagement vs KG capabilities). It implies read-only behavior via 'List', but does not explicitly state side-effect-free operation. With no annotations, the description provides adequate behavioral insight.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two concise sentences, front-loaded with the action and resource, and no wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers the essential context: admin requirement, what the list contains, and the distinction from capabilities. For a zero-param list tool without output schema, this is complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With zero parameters and 100% schema coverage, the description needs no parameter explanation. The baseline applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb 'List' and identifies the resource 'all usermanagement permissions', explaining them as resource/action pairs. It explicitly differentiates from sibling tool brainkb_list_capabilities, making its purpose unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It mentions that KG action-capabilities are listed by brainkb_list_capabilities, offering an explicit alternative and clarifying when not to use this tool. It lacks more general when-to-use context, but for a simple list tool this is sufficient.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, such as user management (activate, ban, assign role) vs. space management (create, add member, set visibility) vs. ingest/jobs (ingest_files, job_status, recover). A few pairs like grant_capability vs. grant_role_capability are similar but descriptions clarify the target, so an agent should be able to choose correctly.
All tools are prefixed with brainkb_ and the large majority follow a verb_noun pattern (e.g., add_space_member, list_tokens, revoke_token). Some exceptions like brainkb_delta, brainkb_search, brainkb_whoami, and brainkb_capabilities break the pattern, but these are few and still readable.
With 49 tools, the server is far above the 25+ threshold for 'too many'. While the broad scope (user admin, spaces, graphs, ingest, provenance, auth) justifies many operations, the sheer number makes it heavy and potentially unwieldy for an agent to navigate.
The tool set covers a wide range of use cases: user/role/capability management, space administration, graph registration, ingest, job monitoring, provenance, search, and SPARQL. However, there are notable gaps such as removing a space member, deleting a space, or updating space metadata, which could leave agents without a way to fully manage the lifecycle of a space.