ASPERN: counterparty checks for agents

Find the vault you mean

list_vaults

Read-onlyIdempotent

The vaults we read, so a caller holding a name rather than a slug can find the one it means. Free. Absence from this list means we do not read that vault, never that it does not exist.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`q`	No	Part of a vault or platform name, matched as typed.
`limit`	No	Default 25, maximum 200.
`offset`	No	Where to start, for the next page: send the `nextOffset` of the previous answer. Default 0.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`data`	Yes	Each with its slug, which is what vault_check takes.
`meta`	No	How current this answer is and what it was read from: `freshness` and the ages behind it. Present on every answer from this server, whatever the tool.
`fields`	No	Which fields this tool kept from the endpoint’s own rows, and where the rest are.
`warnings`	No	Anything the server wants a caller to know about THIS answer before acting on it. Empty is the normal case and is not a guarantee.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedOct 29, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / offset

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Where to start, for the next page: send the `nextOffset` of the previous answer. Default 0.",
+  "type": "number"
+}

Changed2 schema fields changedOct 15, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / meta

Added value: +{
+  "description": "How current this answer is and what it was read from: `freshness` and the ages behind it. Present on every answer from this server, whatever the tool.",
+  "type": "object"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / warnings

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Anything the server wants a caller to know about THIS answer before acting on it. Empty is the normal case and is not a guarantee.",
+  "items": {
+    "type": "string"
+  },
+  "type": "array"
+}

Changed4 schema fields changedSep 26, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / data

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Each with its slug, which is what vault_check takes.",
+  "items": {
+    "type": "object"
+  },
+  "type": "array"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / fields

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Which fields this tool kept from the endpoint’s own rows, and where the rest are.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

removedOutput schema / properties / items

Removed value: -{
-  "description": "Each with its slug, which is what vault_check takes.",
-  "items": {
-    "type": "object"
-  },
-  "type": "array"
-}

addedOutput schema / required
```
Added value: +[
+  "data"
+]
```

AddedSep 26, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive), and the description adds genuinely new semantics: that the list is an allowlist of what is ingested, and that absence means 'not read by us,' not 'does not exist.' That negative-result interpretation is exactly the kind of context annotations cannot express. Ordering and pagination behavior are left to the schema, which documents offset/limit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences with no waste, and the scoping constraint is front-loaded. It is slightly telegraphic — 'The vaults we read' and the fragment 'Free.' read as clipped notes rather than plain guidance, which costs a little immediate intelligibility.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With only optional parameters and an output schema present, the description covers what an agent needs to call the tool correctly and interpret an empty result. Given roughly forty siblings including a near-named `find_vaults`, the missing cross-reference is the main completeness gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all three parameters are already documented, including defaults and the nextOffset chaining convention. The description only loosely reinforces this with 'holding a name rather than a slug,' implying `q` is a name matcher. Baseline 3 is correct when the schema carries the parameter burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The definition names the resource and its scope precisely: 'The vaults we read' tells the agent this is the enumeration of vaults the service actually ingests, and the clause about name-vs-slug clarifies the operative use. It stops short of distinguishing itself from the sibling `find_vaults`, so an agent must guess which of the two lookup tools to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a concrete triggering condition: call this when you hold a name rather than a slug and need the one the service means. 'Free' also signals there is no cost barrier to calling it. It provides no explicit exclusions or routing to `find_vaults`, so the alternative-selection case is left implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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