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SaSame MCP Observatory + Gold Rush Town

capability_profile

Read-only

DEFENSIVE pre-call check for one public MCP server: SaSame classifies its DECLARED tool surface (published tools/list) into capability-risk classes (code-execution / payment / credential / write / send / outbound-fetch / read), flags state-changing tools that publish NO machine-readable safety annotation (so a caller cannot auto-distinguish a read from a write/delete/payment before invoking), gives an exposure tier, and — the part an agent cannot self-produce — which higher-risk capability classes this server NEWLY exposed since SaSame first observed it. ed25519-signed, offline-verifiable. This is an OBSERVATION of the declared surface, NOT a vulnerability/malware scan and NOT a claim the server is unsafe. Use it before wiring an untrusted MCP into an agent. Cost-zero, observed level.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesThe MCP server endpoint URL (https) to profile

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description significantly adds context beyond the readOnlyHint annotation. It details that the tool is cost-zero, operates only on the declared tool surface (from tools/list), flags state-changing tools without machine-readable annotations, provides an exposure tier, and is ed25519-signed and offline-verifiable. It also clarifies it is an observation, not a security claim. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is relatively concise for the amount of information conveyed, but it uses all-caps for emphasis (DEFENSIVE, OBSERVATION, NOT) which aids clarity. It front-loads key purpose and usage intent. A minor improvement could be to shorten some run-on sentences, but overall it is well-structured and reasonably sized.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers what the tool does, how it works (using tools/list, flagging unannotated state-changers, detecting new exposures), and its output characteristics (ed25519-signed, offline-verifiable). However, it does not specify the exact format or structure of the returned profile, which might be expected given the absence of an output schema. Still, it provides a comprehensive high-level overview sufficient for agent understanding.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has one parameter 'url' with a description stating 'The MCP server endpoint URL (https) to profile'. The tool description does not add new semantic information about this parameter beyond what the schema already provides. With 100% schema coverage, a baseline of 3 is appropriate, as the description does not elaborate on URL format or validation rules.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool performs a 'DEFENSIVE pre-call check for one public MCP server' that classifies declared tool surface into capability-risk classes and identifies newly exposed higher-risk classes. It distinguishes itself from siblings by specifying it is an observation of the declared surface, not a vulnerability scan, and differs from tools like 'verify_mcp_cert' or 'audit_mcp'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly tells when to use the tool: 'Use it before wiring an untrusted MCP into an agent.' It also clarifies what the tool is not ('NOT a vulnerability/malware scan and NOT a claim the server is unsafe'), providing clear usage boundaries. While it does not explicitly name alternative tools for vulnerability scanning, the context of 'defensive pre-call check' implies its specific use case.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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