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AIsa Agent Mail

Delete Inbox List Entry

delete_agentmail_inbox_list_entry
Destructive

Removes one entry from an inbox's allow or block list. Returns no body. This changes what the inbox will accept or send from that point on. Entries whose read_only is true are platform managed and cannot be removed — check with get_agentmail_inbox_list_entry first. Writes to the shared AgentMail workspace: Every AIsa caller shares one AgentMail account, so this reaches inboxes other callers created, and what you write here is visible and editable by the next caller.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
typeYesType of list entry.
entryYesEmail address or domain.
inbox_idYesThe ID of the inbox.
directionYesDirection of list entry.
AuthorizationYesBearer authentication

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the annotations by revealing non-obvious behavior: returns no body, permanently changes inbox acceptance/sending, read_only entries are platform-managed and cannot be removed, and writes are shared across all callers in the AgentMail workspace. This gives an agent the full behavioral picture even without annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four compact sentences with no wasted words. The core action is front-loaded, and each following sentence contributes a distinct, necessary fact: no body, future side effect, read-only constraint, and shared workspace context.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description is complete for a destructive, output-less tool: precondition check, no response body, side effects, and shared workspace implications are all stated. Every important runtime behavior an agent needs to choose and invoke this safely is covered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the structured schema already documents all five parameters with descriptions and enums. The description adds only the 'allow or block list' framing, which maps directly to the type parameter but doesn't add significant new meaning beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a precise action: 'Removes one entry from an inbox's allow or block list.' This cleanly identifies the verb, resource, and scope, distinguishing it from the many sibling delete tools and general list-entry tools almost immediately.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides actionable guidance for safe use: check with `get_agentmail_inbox_list_entry` first and understand the shared-workspace side effects. It doesn't explicitly contrast against `delete_agentmail_list_entry`, but the context is clear enough that no reasonable alternative is ambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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