ads_update_copy_deny
Discard prepared copy edits without changing the ad
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Discard prepared copy edits without changing the ad
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description usefully clarifies that the ad itself is not modified (only prepared edits are discarded), but it omits the dependency on a prior prepare step and any permission/auth context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single, front-loaded sentence with no filler; the core action and key constraint appear immediately. It is tight, though perhaps terse to the point of under-specification.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema and annotations cover return values and safety, but for a deny step in a multi-stage flow the description should at least connect to the prepare/confirm siblings and explain the required confirm_token. As written, an agent lacks the context needed to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the required confirm_token plus connection_context are entirely undocumented. The description adds no parameter meaning at all, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap on a required parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('discard prepared copy edits') and adds the differentiating constraint 'without changing the ad', which separates it from the confirm counterpart. It is clear what the tool does, though it never names the sibling ads_update_copy_confirm explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the deny path of a prepare/confirm/deny flow but never states when to use this versus ads_update_copy_confirm or ads_update_copy_prepare. No prerequisites, no explicit when-not guidance; usage is inferred from the name and the sibling set.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.