ads_update_copy_deny
Discard prepared copy edits without changing the ad
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Discard prepared copy edits without changing the ad
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / connection_contextRemoved value: -{
- "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
- "type": "string"
-}Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, so the safety profile is known. The description adds valuable context: despite being destructive, it only discards prepared edits and does not change the actual ad, clarifying the scope of destruction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence with zero waste. It efficiently conveys the core action and a key constraint.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has a required parameter with no description and an output schema, but the description omits parameter guidance and usage context relative to siblings. It is too sparse for a destructive deny operation with a required confirm token.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not mention the required confirm_token parameter at all. With no explanation of what the token is or where to obtain it, the description fails to compensate for the schema gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Discard') and resource ('prepared copy edits'), and clarifies the resource scope ('without changing the ad'). It does not explicitly name or distinguish from the confirm sibling (ads_update_copy_confirm), but the deny action is clear from the tool name and description.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage by stating the tool discards prepared copy edits, but it offers no explicit guidance on when to choose this over ads_update_copy_confirm or ads_update_copy_prepare. No alternatives or exclusions are mentioned.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.