ads_replace_page_deny
Deny a prepared in-place page swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Deny a prepared in-place page swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / connection_contextRemoved value: -{
- "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
- "type": "string"
-}Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare this is a non-read-only, destructive operation. The description adds useful context that it denies a previously prepared page swap, but it does not explain side effects, reversibility, or what happens to the pending operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded phrase with no wasted text. It is perhaps too terse, but it is structurally efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Even with annotations and an output schema, the definition leaves key operational context missing for a destructive denial action: the confirm_token contract, relationship to the prepare/confirm flow, and consequences of denying are not covered.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There is one required parameter, confirm_token, with 0% schema description coverage. The description does not explain where the token comes from, whether it is single-use, or how it relates to the prepared swap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: deny a prepared in-place page swap. It is clearly distinct from prepare/confirm variants by the verb 'deny', though it does not explicitly name those siblings as alternatives.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It implies the operation follows a preparation step via 'prepared', but gives no explicit guidance on when to deny versus confirm or abandon, nor any prerequisites beyond that weak implication.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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