ads_replace_page_deny
Deny a prepared in-place page swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Deny a prepared in-place page swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds nothing beyond that – it does not say what denying actually does (discards the prepared swap? cancels a token? notifies a counterparty?) or whether it is reversible.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single short, front-loaded phrase with no filler. Its brevity is efficient, though it is arguably under-specified rather than genuinely concise given the gaps elsewhere.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need not be described, but for a mutation tool in a confirm/deny pair with 0% parameter coverage, the description omits the workflow context and token semantics an agent needs to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for two parameters, so the description must carry the burden and does not. It never explains what confirm_token is, where it comes from, or what connection_context is for – both are undocumented in schema and description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Deny') and resource ('a prepared in-place page swap'), which cleanly separates it from the confirm/prepare siblings in the naming. It stops short of explicitly naming the sibling it pairs with (ads_replace_page_confirm) or describing the workflow, so it is clear but not fully differentiated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance: nothing about the prepare→confirm/deny lifecycle, when denying is appropriate, or what state the operation must be in. The agent must infer the workflow from sibling names alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.