ads_replace_page_confirm
Confirm an approved in-place page swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Confirm an approved in-place page swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true, covering the safety profile. The description adds the useful nuance that the swap is 'in-place' and requires prior approval, but does not disclose what is destroyed or remediation if the token is invalid.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler; efficient and easy to parse. It is arguably too terse for a destructive confirmation step, but nothing in it is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and annotations cover the mutation profile. Yet for a destructive confirmation tool the critical confirm_token and connection_context semantics and the prepare/confirm/deny workflow context are missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden for two parameters. It hints at an approval token via 'approved' but never ties that to confirm_token, and connection_context (with its strict mctx_v1 pattern) is entirely unaddressed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (confirm) and resource (in-place page swap), which is clear enough to distinguish it from the deny and prepare steps. However, it never names the sibling tools (ads_replace_page_prepare/deny) that define the workflow it belongs to.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Confirm an approved page swap" implies the tool is used after a prior approval/prepare step, giving implicit usage context. But it does not state explicitly when to call this vs. ads_replace_page_deny or ads_replace_page_prepare, nor what precondition (an approved token) must exist.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.