ads_replace_creative_deny
Deny a prepared in-place creative swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Deny a prepared in-place creative swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds the useful nuance that the target is a 'prepared' (pending) swap rather than a live entity, but says nothing about what denying does to that pending state or whether the operation is reversible.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded phrase with no filler, so every word earns its place. It is arguably too terse for a destructive mutation, but structurally it is clean and non-redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be described. However, for a destructive mutation with 0% schema coverage, the description omits the prepare/confirm/deny workflow context, the meaning of confirm_token, and the effect of denial, leaving real gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the schema only gives types: a required confirm_token string and a pattern-constrained connection_context. The description explains neither parameter, leaving the agent without guidance on what confirm_token is or where it comes from.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Deny') and resource ('prepared in-place creative swap'), so an agent can tell it is the rejection counterpart to a prepare/confirm flow. It does not explicitly name its sibling ads_replace_creative_confirm or ads_replace_creative_prepare, so it stops short of full differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance, no mention of the prepare/confirm/deny workflow, and no condition distinguishing deny from simply ignoring or confirming a prepared swap. Usage is only implied by the verb 'Deny'.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.