ads_replace_creative_deny
Deny a prepared in-place creative swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Deny a prepared in-place creative swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / connection_contextRemoved value: -{
- "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
- "type": "string"
-}Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is largely covered. The description adds the useful detail that this acts on a prepared swap, but it does not explain what denying does to the pending operation or whether it is final.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded phrase with no filler. Every word contributes to identifying the operation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is low-complexity and has an output schema, but the required confirm_token is undocumented and the prepare/deny workflow is only implied. For a destructive confirm/deny operation, the description should at least state where the token comes from and what denial does.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the sole required parameter, confirm_token, is never mentioned in the description. The phrase 'prepared' weakly implies a token comes from a prepare step, but the parameter's meaning and source are not clarified.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource: 'Deny' a 'prepared in-place creative swap.' This clearly identifies the operation, though it does not explicitly differentiate from siblings like ads_replace_creative_confirm or ads_replace_creative_prepare.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Implies usage by saying the swap is 'prepared,' so the agent can infer this is the rejection path in a prepare/confirm workflow. However, it never states when to deny versus confirm or what prerequisite must be satisfied.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.