ads_replace_creative_confirm
Confirm an approved in-place creative swap
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Confirm an approved in-place creative swap
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm_token | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | No | ||
| retryable | No | ||
| support_ref | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / else / then / properties / categoryAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / expectedAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / failure_kindAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / responsibility_hintAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / routeAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / else / then / properties / user_visibleAdded value: +{
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is known. The description adds meaningful context by specifying the swap is 'in-place' (the ad is mutated rather than recreated), but it omits that the operation is irreversible, what the confirm_token is bound to, and its likely single-use nature.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler. However, the brevity shades into under-specification for a destructive, token-gated operation rather than being sharply efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, but for a destructive confirm step the description is silent on prerequisites, token provenance, reversibility, and the deny alternative. Given the complexity and the crowded prepare/confirm/deny sibling set, this is too thin.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% across two parameters. The description says nothing about confirm_token (its origin, lifetime, or single-use semantics) or connection_context, so it fails to compensate for the total absence of schema documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (confirm) and resource (creative swap) with the scope qualifier 'in-place'. An agent can tell it is the execution step of a swap flow, but the description never names its siblings (ads_replace_creative_prepare/deny, ads_replace_page_confirm) to disambiguate between the near-identical prepare/confirm/deny families.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The word 'approved' faintly implies a prior approval/prepare step, but there is no statement of when to call this versus ads_replace_creative_deny, whether prepare must run first, or where the token originates. No explicit when/when-not guidance is given.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.