google_ads_connection_permissions_set
Set pull/create/decision policy for one owned Google connection.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| allow_pull | No | ||
| allow_create | No | ||
| allow_decision | No | ||
| connection_ref | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Set pull/create/decision policy for one owned Google connection.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| allow_pull | No | ||
| allow_create | No | ||
| allow_decision | No | ||
| connection_ref | Yes | ||
| connection_context | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / connection_contextAdded value: +{
+ "pattern": "^mctx_v1_[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the agent knows this is a mutating, destructive operation. The description adds nothing beyond that: it never says whether setting a flag to false revokes existing capabilities, whether the change is idempotent, what authorization level is needed, or how it interacts with in-flight operations — exactly the context a destructiveHint warrants.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with zero filler; the scope constraint lands first. It is efficient but arguably too compressed for a destructive five-parameter tool, leaving no room for the clarifications an agent needs.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive mutation with no output schema, zero schema description coverage, and five parameters, the description is substantially under-specified. It omits permission prerequisites, the effect of disabling each flag, and identifier requirements, leaving the agent to guess before making a destructive call.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden. It names the three policy axes (pull/create/decision) corresponding to allow_pull/allow_create/allow_decision, but gives no meaning for true vs false, and leaves connection_ref and connection_context (including their required ID formats) entirely unexplained.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb (Set) and resource (pull/create/decision policy) scoped to 'one owned Google connection', which maps cleanly onto the allow_pull/allow_create/allow_decision parameters and separates it from google_ads_connections_list. It does not explicitly name or contrast with the nearest sibling, google_ads_customer_route_permissions_set, so the reader must infer the scope difference.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or alternative routing guidance. The only constraint offered is the embedded phrase 'one owned Google connection', which implies ownership but never states prerequisites or what to do for non-owned connections.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.