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직원 자격상실 초안 저장

fourinsure__b1__member_qualification__los_save
Destructive

REQUIRES prior fourinsure__session__login call with same account_link_id. 자격상실 신고서를 정보연계센터에 초안으로 저장하고 접수번호를 받습니다. 기관에 실제로 남는 쓰기이고 이 API 로 되돌릴 수 없습니다. 신고서를 기관에 전송하지는 않으며, 마지막 전송은 사용자가 정보연계센터 화면에서 직접 합니다. confirm=true 없이 부르면 저장하지 않고 보낼 값을 미리 보여 주므로, 사용자에게 보여 주고 동의를 받은 뒤 confirm=true 로 다시 부르세요. rrkey 는 자격상실 가입자 조회 결과의 값을 넣습니다.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
rrkeyYesMember rrkey from los_member_lookup.
confirmNoMust be true to save. Default false.
dry_runNoAssemble payload without posting save.
applicant_nameYesMember name in Korean.
account_link_idNoAccount link ID (UUID v4). Optional — the server auto-resolves from your API key when omitted. Provide explicitly only when you have multiple certificates for the same provider. Each institution has a separate ID (Hometax != NHIS != NPS != FourInsure).
common_loss_dateYesCommon loss date YYYYMMDD.
current_year_salary_amountYesCurrent-year total wage.
health_insurance_month_countYesNHI contribution month count.
resident_registration_numberYes13-digit resident registration number.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well past the readOnlyHint=false / destructiveHint=true annotations by explaining that this is a real persistent write at the institution, that it cannot be undone via the API, and that no transmission to the institution occurs until the user acts manually. The confirm-gating behavior is fully disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but every sentence carries load-bearing information (prerequisite, effect, irreversibility, non-transmission, confirm workflow, parameter provenance). Slight structural penalty because it leads with the prerequisite gate rather than the purpose statement, delaying what the tool actually does.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still tells the agent the return value (a receipt number), the auth prerequisite, the irreversibility, and the required two-step consent flow. Nothing an agent needs to call this write correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema carries the field definitions and the baseline is 3. The description adds real meaning beyond the schema: it explains that rrkey must come from the qualification-loss member lookup result and elaborates the confirm=true gating contract beyond the terse schema note.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (qualification-loss report saved as a draft) and names the outcome (receipt number). It clearly distinguishes itself from the read-only siblings los_member_lookup and los_exist_check, and from acqs_save by the '자격상실' scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states the prerequisite (prior fourinsure__session__login with the same account_link_id), the two-step call pattern (call without confirm=true to preview and get user consent, then call again with confirm=true), and the exclusion that final submission happens manually in the center's UI rather than through this tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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