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API-доступ участника

set_workspace_member_api_access
Destructive

Разрешает или запрещает участнику личный API-ключ для этого аккаунта (ключ участника) и задаёт срок. По такому ключу участник видит через API v3 только выданные ему папки и действует в пределах своей роли; биллинг, участники, ключи и интеграции ему закрыты. Запрет сразу отзывает его ключи. Сам ключ участник выпускает в кабинете или через API — в ассистенте секрет не показывается.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "workspace_id": "<workspace_id>",
      "member_id": "<member_id>"
    },
    "name": "set_workspace_member_api_access"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
untilNoДо какого момента разрешено (дата или дата-время ISO 8601, в будущем). Не передан — срок прежний (прошедший сбрасывается); null — бессрочно, до отзыва. Срок выпущенных ключей урезается до него.
enabledNotrue — разрешить, false — запретить и отозвать ключи. Не передан — разрешение не меняется (тогда нужен revoke_keys).
member_idYesID участника (member_id из get_workspace_members).
revoke_keysNotrue — отозвать уже выпущенные ключи участника, не меняя разрешения (например, при утечке ключа).
workspace_idYesID воркспейса (из workspace://list).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description goes well beyond them: it states what the key grants (only the member's assigned folders via API v3, bounded by their role), what stays closed (billing, members, keys, integrations), that denying immediately revokes existing keys, and that the secret itself is never displayed in the assistant. Those are exactly the side effects and limits an agent needs before invoking a destructive member-management tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, each carrying distinct information: the action, the resulting key scope, the revoke-on-deny consequence, and where the key is actually issued. Nothing is restated and the action is front-loaded in the first clause.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, no-output-schema mutation the description covers effect, scope, and revocation behavior well. It omits who is authorized to call it (owner/admin requirement) and whether re-enabling restores previously revoked keys, which are the remaining gaps an agent would want closed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all five parameters are already documented in detail, including the tri-state semantics of 'until' and the 'enabled' vs 'revoke_keys' split. The description only echoes that a term is set, adding no syntax, defaults, or interaction rules beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a precise verb pair and resource: it enables or disables a member's personal API key for this account and sets its expiry. That is far more specific than the tool name alone, and the resource ('ключ участника') separates it conceptually from role, folder, or block management. It never names a sibling tool explicitly, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the described effect (grant/deny a personal API key, set or clear a term), but there is no explicit 'use this when…' or 'do not use this when…' guidance. Nothing routes the agent between this and set_workspace_member_blocked, set_workspace_member_role, or set_workspace_member_folders, which sit in the same family.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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